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This thesis investigates the- capabilities of tltc Early Entry Theater LE'vel Model 
(EElL M). a modif;erl vCfsion of the Future Thc~ter Level Model. It incorporaTe, Joint 
theater leve l operations within a dynamic decision making framework and a stochastic 
environment. This thesis includes a rationale of why a ,tochastic jOt;]! theater 11'. odd if; 
needed, a detaik'd description of the model 's basic operations. and the enhancements and 
modifications which afe req:lircrl 10 incorpo rate joint operations The develomncnt of 
measures of effectiveness, and the ir suhsequent analysis, focu;; on the unique 
perception-based capabilities of EETUv1 and its ahility to provide new insights to joint 
~ask force commanders. Thc analvsis focusc, on alternativc force lc,'el/time combinations 
and their resubnt differences in outcomes Where reSlJ l ~s appeared counterilltuitive 
fu rther invest igat ions were conducted , These areas were either analyzed and documented 
or foHowed by brief de5criptions of requi red future wort for EETLr-l EETLM 
successfully demonstrated its capability 10 incorporate joint theater level operations, 
however. the analysis indicates that some of the rudimentry algori thms and the current 
computational platform af<~ limiting EETLM"; capabilit ies 
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A The principk purpose of this thesis was to demonstrate the capability of the 
Early Ent!}' Theater Level Model (EETLM) to model joint theater level conflict in a 
stochastic cnvironment. The focus oftnis thesis is a proof of principle, not a statistically 
study Only a limited numbers of replications were conducted to show the variability in 
outcome. Additionall y, the secondary purpose was to document and test the design of this 
new stochastic joint theater level model. The simulation scenario will be conducted on the 
Korean peninsula to support three specific cases of joint operations (early Naval and 
Marine involvement, late Naval and Marine involvement, joint {simultaneous\ Anny, 
Navy, and Marine involvement) This scenario does not permit the investigation of early 
entry issues, however docs permit the investigation of joint re inforcing operations The 
Korean scenario was developed originally for FTLM's use, and was the only scenario 
available for use in a stochastic theater level model The specific thesis goals arc 
Build ajoint model with air, ground and sea interfaces 
Develop a realistic theater level scenario, which exercises Ihe model and 
ultimately demonstrates the capabilities of the model to represent a joint theater 
Develop measures of effectiveness to address theater level joint early entry 
issues planning, and "what ir' analyses 
Develop measures of effectiveness; to as.';ess the impact of joint opelat ion<, 
lder.tify areas where there are potential moriel validity problems 
B. The following issues were investigated within the scope of the this thesis' overall 
pU!pose and goals 
Impact of Course of Action (COA) Percepti ons on Joint Operations 
Perception Changes Ovcr timc 
COAschosen 
Impact of time 
Timmg of the decision to conunit Joint Early Entry forces 
PH:pm,ition afloat 
Us~fulness ofEETLM to the Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander 
In the planning phase of the operation 
EnrOllte to the theater of operation 
fhe time phased strength levels (comba! effectiveness levels) of all 
C To specifically address the above issllCs, the measures of effectiveness listed 
below were developeri 
Foree Remaining Ratio for both sides 
Loss Exchange Ratio 
f heater Campaign stopping rules 
xill 
Did Red reach its objeclives (all or some)~ 
Did a side reach its breakpojn1~ 
Blue's pereeplion of Red's COAs, given Red is conducting a spccifie COA 
Red's perception of Blue's (OAs 
Blue's perception of Red's attack time 
Blue decision (time) for when to eom1nit reinforcing forces 
D. Snapshots of the simulalion were taken at these times to obtain all the requisite 
data requirements to satisfy the MOEs 
STARTEX: the slart oflhe simulation 
ATTACK TIME 
PERCEIVED ATTACK TIME 
EVERY COA UPDATE CYCLE 
SURFACE-TO-SURFACE ENGAGEMENTS 
ENDEX the tennination of the simulation 
E. A notional scenario, focu~ed around the defense ofthc Korean peninsula. was 
used as the major regional contingency (MRC). The scenario called for a massive Red 
attack from the north, and a defensivc response from Blue. Blue responded in one of 
three ways an early arrival of joint force s~ a late arrival of join! forces; and an on limc 
arrival of joint fo rces. Blue's response was pre-determined by the author to capture the 
differences between entry cases Red's selection of CO A was determined by the analyst. 
however, Blue's eOA was dynamically detcrmined. within the cntry case, hy the model 
Thne were thl-ee Red eOAs developed, and al l lhree were used against all Biue e:ll ry 
cases A IOtal of twenty seven rellli~a(ions were run, three celllications for tach of the 
(hIte Red eOAs against each of the three Blue entry casts Because the prototype mode l 
is not fuHy mat ure. complete st.atistical analysis using la rge nUI11ber of replications is 110t 
appropriate for this thesis. The results of the various combinations of Red eOA and Blue 
cn:ry case were ana lyzed and it wa~ conduded that EETLM possesses the capabilit ies to 
1Il0de~ Joint theater level operations in a sto ~hastic environment The current limitations 
imposed hy the rudimentary algorithms and the computational plalfonn pn:vent EETLM 
from providing intuitive results The fmal chapter in this thesis recomwends areas for 
i1.1(llTe i1ll1l~ovement of the modl'l 

I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPO SE Of THESIS 
The goal oftnis research paper is to investigate the capabiiitie3 of the Future Theater 
Level Mod~l (FlLM) to answer real world questions tha~ have arisen from the new world order 
Sp~ci:ica l l y. th:s t h ~$is examines FlLM's capabil,ty to provide the US Army Training and 
DOC\fllle CommanJ (TRADOC) and the Early Entry Let hali ty Survivability (EELS) Hattlc Lab 
with rnean:ngfu[ resulTs and analysis which auda."ss the timing of joint forces and the impact of 
vary ing the s:les of forward deployed fOlces. Also. this thesis investigates FTU\.l 's capability of 
providing an ~ar l y entry Joint Task Force (JTF) commander with va luab le feedback about his 
operation in thc planning phase and while en:oute to the theate:. This thesi.,; will usc a modified 
version ofFTLM, the Early Entry Theater Level MoJe! (EETLr..l). to investigat~ these 
capabi lities 
R. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Given a scenario, a jo int task force. and EETLM 
Can EETL\1 ade'luateiy incorporate Joint fiJrees and model the conduct of Joint 
Operations? 
Other questions that wi li need to be answered. in support of this question are 
Is EETLM sensitive to the impacts oftirne and varratiOJlS injornt eaTiy ent ry force ;;ize,~ 
Can these impacts b~ incorporated in the an3lysis') 
Once [ETUvI has matured compl~tely, and demonstr~ted its capabilities to model ioil11 
theater level operation~, a cr it ical question which can hc ~xp l ored is What arc the requireu force 
s;les offorv..'ard deplov~d units1 This question will be left for future work: however, some of the 
methodology disellssed later is applicable. The r~aJer is referred to the Methodolog\' (Ch~p(er 
lll) fo r a more detailed explanation of these and other questions 
c. SeQl'E OF THESIS 
In light of the draw down and lhe sub~tantial hudget n its across all ofrhe Armed forces, 
the analysis and re~ults of th~se questions are of critical importance The U.S Army Training and 
Doctrine Command (TRADOC), in particular, and Ihe Army, in general, arc looking for ways in 
which to economize, yet still have lhe requisite force projection capabilities, Joint operat ions are 
a viable way to accomplish this task [Ref 1, pg. 3-1] EETLM posst"sses the ability to model 
Joint operations, to simulate some of the conditions of uncertainty found in the new world order 
and provide rt"sults anu analysi~ ()fjoim operation~ , EETLM is a stochastic combat simulation 
mooel being developed al the Naval POSlgraouale School. The model focuses on perce;Jtions 
which ~re dynamically generated from senwrlintc1hgenee reports. The ensuing actions in EETLi\l 
are taken based on those perceptions, EETLM has been enhanced to incorporate joint operations 
(Army. Air Force, l\'avy, and Marines), pereeplion on both sides and on all node types (Ihe 
ground representalion is an arc - node nelwork). dynamic Course of Action (COA) selections 
based on perceptions. and subst~ntially larger force sizes This thesis will use EETLM to examine 
the impact of response times of joint forces (Navy. Marine, Air Force. and Armv) within c. 
notional majm regional conflict The simulation scenario wili be conducted on the Korean 
;Jeninsula to support three specifiC cases ofjoint opermions (early Naval and Marine involvement, 
!ate:'ava l and MMir:e involvernent.io in! : simulwneous: Arm:>,. Navy. and l\1aTin~ involveillent) 
Till> sce nario dots no ! permit the inves tigation cf early entry issuts. ho\vever . il doc, permit t he 
Illvestigation cfJoint reinforcing operations Thc Korean scenario wa:; origirully cle\'eloped fo r 
FTLM 's use and was the only scenario availab!t":01 use in a stccha.'ilic theater level model In the 
scenar io. the Red fcrces wi ll be tht aggresSDrs and atlack from the north, The Blue forces wi ll 
Tlet initiate aggressior., but will defend the south The thesis will itlvestigak the sensi!ivil> of 
EETUvllO variat ions in joim capahilities and rtsponst" timt.<; The se~sillvity anal\'ses will f(lcll~ 
o~ perceptions of courses of actions. time phasing offoTces, and joint operat io n> fo r hot h enemy 
and friendly forets Navy LT Michael Ful kerson and this author developed the JOInt capabilities 
a:ld scenario fo r EETL.\1, L T Fulker50n's tilesis aHalysis focu ses on the naval aspect of the model 
whereas this thesis focuses more on the ground aspe<:t s of the operations. The ,eader is referred 
to LT Fu lke rson's thesis for the specific naval detai ls [Ref 2J 
D. BA CKGROUND 
The !'laval Poslgratiume School wa~ iIlltially tasked to develop a stochastic tlwater level 
model by the Force Structure , Resource, and Assessment Directorate (J 8) of the Jo int Chiefs of 
Staff Withi Ti HL the Analyt ira l Tools Program mission statellle:ll requirt"d them fO 
Since the initlai model development at the Naval Postgraduatt" School T RADOC has also 
become a participant in the development ohhe model The Kaval Postgraduate School. Oftke of 
the Deputy Chiefof Staff for CO",b~1 Development. Office ortlle Depllly Chief of Staff for 
Doctrine, and the Louisiana Marleu\ers Task for(;e have entered into an agreement to ~dapt the 
FTL,\l archi tecture to solve doctrinal prob lems of interl'st 10 TRADOC specifically in opemtions 
mi1er than war and joint operations. On~ of the primar), missions of TRADOC is to develop 
training and doctrine to support the missions of to day's Army and for the future The design of 
doctrine for operatio ns other than war and the evaluation of joint doctrine. organizations. and 
materiel hav~ been identified as significant issues facing the Force Projection Army TRADOC 
has determined that ex isting modds such as T ACWAR. CASTFOREM, VIC and other model, 
are not adequate to represent these operations [Ref 4] General hanks stated, "rewkkering of 
existing models won't work. We need a new set of In ode Is 10 examine the changing missions and 
threats." [Ref 5] This model has heen demonstrated and briefed to General f ranks, Commanding 
General , TRADOC and to the Board of Advisors of the Naval Postgrauuate School 
F. TH ESIS ASSUMPTIONS 
The follow ing as.'>umptions arc made for this initial version ofEETL~f 
• It is assllmed that EETLM contains all relevant. true. and viable Courses of Action, 
((OAs). Thl' implication of this assumption. (the closed worlu assumption) is that any other 
COAs not present or repre~entcd in EETLM are therefore assumed to be false, irrelevant. and/or 
not viable [Ref 6, pg . \ 77J t\ method of including olher nonspecifIC (OAs and the benefits 
associated with the ir incorporation wi ll be discussed ill Chapter VI 
• The basic combat maneuver uni ts arc Infant ry. Armor. and Mechanized. only 
• Divisions, or Groups normally operate with three to four Brigades (Bdes) 
• In;e ll igencc c~pab i l i t y exists (HUMTNT . SIGrNT . JST ARS) t(1 "l'tain il. ll il. CCLJ r~ l e C(1 l1 ilt 
of thC" numbns ofBdes in a Division 01 G roUI! 
• A massive logi<;l ica l build-up. fo t-...va rd, is an indicator of an impend ing ~!(a ~ ~ A 
m"ssive k)g i Sli~a l b:li ld -up is dt:fllled as suffi cient !ogis tical Slip plies to support the perceivcci tOlal 
number of brigades required in combat for one week 
• Al l the un it dala suc h as size, conf:gura t;on, ~omhal power. strengtl l o~aliuns, logistic 
>l rengl h and consumption rales. and othe r tactica l dements hcl ve been formulated to ke~p this 
wo~k Ll nclassified Howeve r, the ideas, prir.ciples. quest ions , and answers can bt: used in 
clas>ifleci sce:larios w here appropriate 
F. THESIS LIMITATIONS 
The following limi tations exists in th is version ofFTLM 
• This thesis uses a Kore~ n scenario which permits the ev~lij~l ion of joint force> in cl 
reinforcing roie, not in an early entry ro le The scenMio also permits the evaluation ot'the timing 
of the reinfor~ement However. Ihis scenario is not an early entry scenario 
• Thc modd has not u:ldt:rgone any rigorous va lidation Oncl" the rr:odel matlJl'es, 
val idations o f all aigo,ithms will take pl ace, All the algorithms are malhemalically suu:ld, it is the 
trans!ati on into computer code \vhich must be validaled to i:lsure accuracy 
• At the SIan Oflht: sirnu lat io:l. :mlil the filst eOA update, the initia l perceptions of t:ach 
COli.. expressed in probabi l ili~> . arc al l equa lll' i i~dy T his is son:ewl:ar UJlrea lis ' ic. but in II:e 
mature EETLM. the ~ nal yst wi!1 be able to inpu t in itii'. l eOA perceptions. which ar~ no t t:C]ually 
• The nwnber and size offOf'lvard dep loyed unit s is held consta nt 
• The division force SiltS (number of brigades) arc limited to II nlw,iwull1 oft011r C(1ll1 il?t 
bngade units 
• A division can be composed of any combination of combat brigades (Hdes) . tota ling 
four 
• Once a COA is chosen by tbe attacker or defender. it remains fixed Currently. there is 
no way to dynamically shift COAs in mid·simulaTion. Future developments for rTUvi should 
include the ability to dynamically reallocate COAs during a simu lation replication 
• The ground arc - node network is restricted to a ma~imum of two transit nodes between 
any two physical nodes This limitation e~ists in the current hardware and software configuration 
and it is due to the computational complexity involved when calculating the Bayesian perception 
updat~s associateu with each node (both physical anu transit) anu each p~rmlltation 
• No more than one Division. 01 Group. orthe same side if; allowed on a node (physical 
01 transit) at any on~ time, becausc EETLM currently cannot difl"erentiate between the two 
ditlerent uivisions, or groups. As a resu lt. the model attempts to determine the probabilities oflhe 
possible permutations of the larger composite group. and this becomes too computationally 
intense This limitation is discLJsseu in more delail in Chapter VI 
• EETLM does not aHow for node partitioning within a node fherefore, once a unit 
occupies a node. its sub-units cannot be assigned inuividuai sectors or orientaTions within the 
node itself This feature will be added in future versions of the model 
• EETLM has the ability to conduct sensor observations aftt:! a unit dt:lection. on b(1th 
transit and physical nodes EETU\l automatically conducts sensor obse.vations after each unit 
detection on a transit flode. but does not do so on physica l noues. because of the computational 
comp l ~xilleS invo lved . To allow for some" sensor observations on phvsicai nodes. the rllys ic ~1 
nodes wtre JivideJ and packaged i 'l~o sensor groups The fr('quenc y of the senso r observa ' ion, 
wa" depend ~nt upon the priority the ~ensor g,oup 
• Curren tly, a p<,rc('ption link b('tw('en air anivit ". (CAS, B/\J) in , upport ora g ou nd 
COA. and the actLlal gmund COA does not exist 
• Nav~ 1 pow('r prOject ion (; e" Naval Surface Fire Su pport (NSF S) romah~wk and 
can;e~ b~ sed air) is 5cripttd and is not dynamical ly linked to th~ ground eOA A PP.I-c('pt io[l lin J..: 
be t'ween Naval support u:d the actual ground eOAs OOp.s not exist 
• There is lirlliteo Air Fo rce and Air Defense Artillery capabi li lies on both sid~s EETLM 
h~s a IOtal oftlVo ~ir bases (one for e~ch side) . Blue h~s two squadrons one F- JA squadron ~mi 
or.e F-I S sq uadron, Red has four ~quJdrons lwo e~ch o[!vfiG-:!3 and Stj·25 E~ch sioe also 
onJy h~s lWO Jivis;ons wi th ADA c~pab iiili e s 
Most. ifnOl ~l ! of the limitalions noted above are dlle 10 lile computalional li milations 
if! lpOsed by the platform ~nd 50ftware ~tnlc l ur~ of the current model As the mode! mature" it 
wi! 1 bt tr~nsvorted to a pla tfo rm with much greater capabili ties. so that th~ computalional 
complexities will not be a li miting factor 
G. THESIS FORI\-IA 1 
I. eILa lHer T 
rhe pLl rpose, scope and hackground olthis thesis have be~n vr~sented 
2. Chapter II 
rh is ch~pte r of the thesi, Jiscusses the motivation hehind the developmer't oi"FIL/l.J 
Th is discussion includes the impact of the new \vorld order, the tlncert: aint ie5 inherent in combat 
and the problems ~ssociatcd with existing theater level models. A detililed descripTion of the 
cun ent state ofFTLM is pJeSenleo, which focuses 011 the command . control. commun~Cil tions 
and i:1telligence (C II and the dettction and fusion processes. The fmal por1ion of this chapter 
OLltlines the development of EETUvl The focus is primarily onlhe new algorithms_ the Jo in! 
c<lpabililies. and the scenario 
3. Chaptcl'llI 
Chapter III provides a methodology for addressing thc thesis problem statement in 
Chapter I The problem statement is decomposed inTO issues for invcsTigations which are funhe, 
rdined and quantified into measures of effectiveness (MOE) and data requirements. A data 
source matrix is provided to identifY which data requirements will be used to satisfY Jvl0Es and 
issues Critical simulation evems for data collection are idemitied and described T he method for 
analysis of the daTa and :Vl0Es are also described 
4. Chllptcr 1\' 
Chapler IV discusses lhe results and analysis of the test replications The analysis is 
discussed in two parts. The firSI part is the traditional MOE analysis. which is followeri by the 
perception analysis The goal is to address the issues, and by !.loing so, demonsl rate the 
capabilit ies of EETLM in modeling joint theater levd operations. Some of the results indic~te 
current shortcomings with the prototype EETLM. One of the purposes of this thesis was 10 
discover these problems for !i.uure model enhancements_ Therefore, the rt"ader should focus on 
the type of analyses possible using EETLM rather than the specific numerical results from the 
currem prototype 
5. C hill"e .. V 
From the analysis in Chapter IV, conclusions will be drawn and recommendations made 
concerning EETLM 
6. ChllpterVI 
Future work for EETLM is suggested in this chapter. based on the problems 
encountered with the current capabilities that were developed for EETLM, and future capabilities 
which must be Included in the mature model 

U. FTLM ARCHITECTURE 
A . MOT IVATIOI\" 
FTLM was developed to provide a mOTe redlistic dppTOdch 10 handli ng new opemt ions 
FTLM's approach does no: revolve around tile classical European sc~nario and grollnd truth, but 
I-at her. around pnceptions, u:lcertaimies ofwdT. surprise, and command, comrol, 
comrnunicatio l]s, and Intelligence (ell) It proviue5 the decision n1ak~r with an explicit 
I-epl-esen(a(ion of the variability oftbe outcomes. given certain input comlitions. without causing 
analytic chaos. This chaos is sometimes produceu in ~eterministic models when d~p~ndent. or 
m[eT · related input parameters are varied FTLM ~Iso has the added benefit of having reduced 
size, pOllability, and easy database and scenario setup. it is a closed form simulation, which 
allows for repcated replica:ions, ease of e'<perimentation, and multiple excursion;; to determine 
cause and effect relationships AJI decisions and ~etion5 taken within FTLM Me based on 
perceptions generated from dyndmic intelligence reports, no: ground truth. The perceptions and 
inteli igence repons are fU5ed ii' a C!l process which generates dec isions. The structure of the 
n10del is network based and supports nonline~r ground and sea movement and dyn~lllic air 
movement Thest" maj or development objectives m~k(" FTLI'>1 unique and su itable to aid in 
doc trinal desi,gn and evaluation or new operations and concepts [Ref 7J 
I. New World Order 
The new worJu order heg~n with the disintegration of the Soviet Ur. ion and the t3erlin 
\V?I I These event, caused a destabi lizing effect in the world When there wele two 
superpowers. most second and third world countries were aligned with one power or Ihe other 
II 
Th~ alignme-nt guarante-ed them military s~curity in e-xchange for political como l ian~e Therefore-
the Unitd States hau to conce-ln itselfprim~rily with the Soviet Union However, since the re ale 
no longer '.wo suoerpowels, the second and thild world countries, who had aligned t llemsC"lves 
1Nir.h the Soviet Lill ion, no longer have that military security by vi:-rue of tile if ~lignment anu no 
longer have to comply politically or militarily with anyone As a direct result . the United States 
must concem itself with numerous second and thi rd world countries whose behaviors are totati" 
unpredictable and, at times. complet ely irraTional. This makes fo r an extremelv uncenain world in 
which the old rule5 of politics. combat. and influence no longer apply 
2. Uncertainty of Combat 
Very few things in the world are cenain Most things having v~rying degrees of 
cenainty associated I,l,'i th them . Combat. almost by definition. is unceT1ain No one can predicted 
with complete accuracy who \'\";11 win, and why. Thele are many factors which are indicators of 
the possible success of one side over another. but these ind icators cannot be quantified and 
predicted with enough accuracy to allow combat to be cenain Human factor5, such as dynamic 
leadersh ip, bravery, loyalty. tra ining, fat igue, and morale. are among a few such indicators Evert 
if these indicators could be quanlified, the degree to which cach factor would impaCI on any given 
event would vary . His torical studies have shown thaI these factors arc indicators and not ah;;oiute 
prediclors II does not make sense to attempt to model future combat withoul considering 
uncertainlY FOlce sizes. stru c tur ~s, l:omrosition_ intelligence. new tactics. and new weaponry arc 
~ few orlhe uncertainties which must he incorporated inlO combat simulation models CIeMlv 
comhat is no! understood with enough detail. Tho,c factors that are understood cannot be 
quantified sufficiently to make certain predictions ofoutcoml's These uncena inlies make 
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pred ict ing combat out~,orne problematic, ;!nd tend to indicate that modeling combat should be 
rione using some soot of a sto::hastic process, [Ref. RJ 
J. Existing Models 
Recent 5rud:es and research have indicated that rhe current theater level model 
r .AC\V AR, is nor adaptabie tor nev.' werld type opermions [Ref. 4] \1ost existing models (ie 
T AC THUNDER, C£1\1. FORCEM, VIC EAGLE, TLC/l\'Lc' SOTACA, ami 
W:\ RSIMfNASM) aTe ei ther deterministic in des ign. ust' methodologies haseri on ground truth. 
~r-e riesigned ro support a European bault, or have poor, o~ co C'l intt'gratiol1, The~e moods do 
not possess Ihe requi red anal)1ica! tools necessary to moJeJ today's new world order [Ref 7J 
Jklerm;n;S/ic Des;gn 
Any model which doe5 nOI contain probabilities, or rando:n effects, is a 
deterministic model Stochas tic models use probabil ity distributions, ove r- the sample S[lace of 
possible outcomes to model the ullcerla int ie5 of the real world and combat [I{ ef 9. pg. 3] The 
previous!y mentioned existing models can be chalacterized as low resoilition, highly aggregated. 
ami depicting combar as a deterministic phennmellon. 1n general . the outcomes can be abnormally 
ser.sir ive to minor input change~ which car. produce chaotic results The results do nor account 
for- any measure ofuncenaillty in the output. given uncenainty ill the inputs [Ref. 8) The 
methodology of depicting combat as a determinist ic phenomenon is intended to provide the 
expecreo resu lts of combat. However, even when averages are used as inputs. the OlllplllS Me no ' 
neceS<;ari iy representative of mean_ or average our comes of combat The US Army Concepts 
Analysis Agency. (C/\A), in August 1()91, found that most of the r-esuits (point values) produced 
bv determinis tic models were noticeably differ-ent from the expected values produced by 
]) 
stochastic IT.odeis. Somc of tile results fell outside of the range of results pwdllceu 11\ the 
stochastic models [Ref 10) CAA also found tha t these results were statistically ~ignificantly 
different [Ref IIJ Funner. if we consider this result as an extension of Jer.sen 's Ine'lualit" (from 
one variable to the n variables associated with a combat model). the reader can appreciate why 
averages used as inputs do not produce average outcomes, Jensen's Inequality i, as follows 
IlE(X)J $ ElfiX)J (I) 
The Jensen's Inequality states that if a convex function i, applied to an expected 
value (or average) the result will be less than. or equal to, the expected value of all the results 
produced by the convex function from the input values used to produccd the original expeded 
value The inequality is reversed iff(X) is a concave function Qnly when the ftlllction is linear 
docs the strict eqLlality hold IntLiitively, if there exists variance in the outcome of a random 
variable (Var(X) ~ Oand Var(X) '" E(>;1) - [E(X»)" ? 0) then il is obvious that £(X')? [EV0F 
[Ref 12, pg 298J 
b. Comnlmll/, C0I1/rol. Communications, and intefligcncc 
In the past , most of the theater level models foc used on the te rrain representat ion, 
Ihe attrition process, and ground tnlth orientation. The C'J process was nOI empha,ized because 
the scenarios, battlefields, initial posilions, boundaries, force sizes. force structures, objeCTives. 
and doctrine were well studied and defined. Tbese types of models portray massive attrition 
battles fought in Corps seelors with distinct FEBA movements. The need to analyze decisions was 
minimal. since both sides knew unit locations. sizes. strengths. capabilities, and eOA, with 
relat ive certainty [Rd'. 13 J Some of the later models have atTempted to incorporate a C'J 
process, but almost as aTi afterthought. [Ref 8J Such precise and perfect inteilit'ence is not a 
luxury afforded Ihe real world Models which use the ground truth methodology cannol 
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I n~()rporate an "dequMe CI proCe-3S capab!e of rcpreser. ting the ri-a;it ies. colll ri bLlt,ons, and 
dy,;amics of operational C'I SL!fplis~, envelopments. fei nts. and decept iun cannot be mode l ~d in 
these types of t: n viJonm~Ill' 
B. C":TRR£NT i\IODEL 
1. An:llytkal Stru cture of FTLM 
Analytical so!L:tions 01 symbolic rTlo r.e ls Ll~e explicit mathernat ica l fornlu las to obtain 
outpLlt va riables, as a function on ly ofinpul variabies These anal yti~al solutions are der ivt:d by 
manipLl lating mathematical formulae and applying maThemat ical m les 10 obtain the dbired 
outcome These ou T come~ are t:wol-able becau<,e They establish direct re lationships between 
inputs and O:Jtpub (ca u,e ami effect) FTL'\ij is a symbolic mode l. The main characteristics of 
FT LM are its stochastic and dynamic nature. high information flow, and aggregalion. The 
symbolic nature ofFTL\1. in conjunction with simulation, numeric, and an aly1ical solu tion 
melhoc!" ai l ow> it 10 deduce solulions which are usefullo military decis ion makers 
[he solut ions oblained by FTLM will either be an explici t formu la fo r a probability 
distribul ion, or sUlllmary statistics (i.e" mea" and variar,ce) of The output ~vailab]e . One ofThe 
rnajor mod eling object ive.> of'FTLM is to capture thc va~iability of performance mea>ure~. not illst 
the mear, values The numeric solutions wil l he derived by malhematical manipula tions and 
,;itnll ialion Additionally, sensitivity anaiyses can be conducted with this output hy analyzing the 
ditTe rer.ces in the distrihUlions rroduced, or summary statislics [Ref 14, pg 2]-:!4] 
2. Environment of the model 
Tht moders environment is an arc node network syst~m Two arc - node networks . a 
ground and an air network, accommodate all ground and air moven,ent within FTLM . This 
movement includes the movement of combat units. logistical units and. aircraft [Ref 14. pg. 14] 
GrOl/m/ Ncnl"urk 
1n the ground arc - node network, the arcs are referred to as transit nodes and the 
nodes are referred to as physical nodes. Physical nodes represent geographic locati('n~ such as 
citics. key terrain, objectives, imer$cctions of avenue, of approach. or defensive positions A 
transit node connects physical and/or other transit nodes together A transit node has four 
attributes used to model the terrain between node types. The four a!lribllles are distance. road 
classification, width of the mobility corridor. and terra in classification which includes severity of 
te rrain and obstacles Transit nudes represent mobility currid or$. avenUC$ of approach. or 
movement routcs Units do not actually move along transit nodes, rather. they occupy transit 
nodes The time spent in the transit node is stochastically determined. based on the allributes of 
the specific transit node, unit size, type. and mission, Time spent on phvsical nodes works the 
same way, unless missions dictated otherwise. On both node types, sensor observations can be 
taken and fused in the C'T process \0 update intelligence (such a, unit sizt:s. locati on, and most 
probable enemy COA) and make dt:eisiuns.lRef. 14. pg 2:>-28] 
h. Air Netwvrk 
A different network system exists within FTLM to ~\lI'I'on air operatiuns A 
~quare grid system is overlaid on top of the ground network (t heater of operations) Tile grid 
sizes can be modified to support specifIC scenario re'luiremems [Ref 14. pg 1~ 1 The ail n,ouule 
is composeJ of three Jist inci suh-mode l ~ Model J uses the air grid netwO'k dnJ fdci !il;>Jc.-s Ihe 
c~ l culil.llOn oflh~ p~rcelllage ofcovera~e (bot h ~ctud l dnJ perceived) a ground unil'S ~ir defens~ 
SV~lem, has on speCific air grids Ivlod ei II allows each side to use ;IS percein'd coverdges 10 
dc.-Ierm;r,e ingress amI egress routes for all pos.iihle ai r missions Mod~11II of lhe 2.i ~ module 
prioritiLts targfts and mission cavable ai :craft. a;,d then optimally selects a cOl~bination of 
targets, nu mber ~nd type of aircraft and rOliUS to carry OUi al l air missions [Rff I ~l 
J. COlllmnnd. C Olllrol, CO!1lmunicnrions. and lntl'lIigence 
Ground units move along the network using a minimllm cost algor ithm. which 
considers rhf shonest distance, pereeivt'"d enemy locations, and tactical difficulty 10 move from 
node (0 node Ifit is tacticaliy prudem. a unit will div ide imo sub-uni ts and travel along diITerem 
tr:mSIl nodes to reunite. or coniJuct an a!tack at another physica l node This m~y be done to 
achieve survrise or experiite movement !ftwo or more units on opposing sides occupy the same 
phv,ica! node at the same lime and detee! each othe:. close comha~ may Ol.;cur 0:1 physical 
nodes. comba t will be adjud icated as a hasty or deliherate attack of one uoit Oil a defel,ding unit 
The ull i, o~cupying the physic~lnode t'trst wil l bt'" the defender, and, depending on the length of 
time before the attack, will be in a hasty 01 del:beta~e defensive posture O:1lransit nodes. combat 
IS adjudicated as a meeting engagement jfboth forces expect 10 make contact with an opposing 
force . or both sides do not expec~ 10 make con:act , but happen to make contac~ , unexpected ly If 
one side expects to make eontac( and the other side does oat. eombat;s ~djud;ca\cd as an 
,lmbu,h [Hef 14. pg -,OJ 
Ii. Planning 
FTUvl"s plamling module contains a series of algorithms which Ji lo \\' each , ide 
when making decisions. to usc its perceptions ofoppom."nl's COAs and stJiUS to conduct "plav 
allead " enUlnerlltions of its possible actions. The algorithms compule potential payoffs associated 
with each alternative action The planning module then selects the best alternative action 10 
accompiish the mission Currently. the planning module is used to determine unit movement 
routes along assigned corridors. whcther or nOl a unit should divide into sub-uni ts during 
movemcnt. whether or not a unit should atlack II perceived enemy and from which direction. and 
whether or not a unil sh(luld subdivide during t he conduct ofils at!ack. The module's algorithms 
consider perceived combat power, level ofC ' l. rates of lire. surprise. and force ratios when 
making dccisions. [Rcf 14. pg 30-4~} 
Detection 11m! Fusion 
All units are subject to detection on all transit nodes from enemy sensors. The time 
to delection is determined by a random draw from an exponential distribution Once a unit 
occupies II transit node, the time to deTect is drawn and then an opposing sensor is al located to 
make a st""Hsor observation (counts ofasscts). The sensor caplIbility and accuracy are determined 
by the user. when sensor data are entered into the database. Tbrougb a scries ofSaycsilln updlltes 
over Time. the detection ofunils, by lIsset counts. leads \0 lhe determination of perceived unit 
l V[l~S. size_~, strength. capabilities. locations. and overall course;; ofaclion These pen:eplions arc 
used to make decisions in FTUvJ for movement routes, air mission allocations. ground Rallcks. 
deep strikes. lind COA selections. {Ref 14. pg 41·70] Each side determines the most likely COA 
ils opponeJII will use by the following method There are tbree Iypes ofrerception updlltes tha t 
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nep.d to be ~cns,dered Type I is a eOA pelcep!ioll update when there have be~n 110 (Iekctions 
on any avenues of approach within the COA L~ pda t e period , Type:: i5 a CO,\ perception update 
when there have been detections on all avenues of approach within the COA upd~te period , and 
f ype 3 is a CO,\ peception update when the re have beeTi detections on some of the aven'le5 of 
~ppro~ch but not all. In a Type I eOA per~eption upda~e, for each s i d~ and for evelY COA 
update ~ vcle . EETLM runs ~ mini simulation within tilt EETLM simulat ion to enlJll1er~!e tht 
po"ible r:ext moves of~1 1 opposing units , Thest next moves wi li ht referred to as the moves 
which occur in the (K---I )st period , T he enumeration has beer: li;nited to a sper.: iflc number (R=20 
enumeration repli~ations), because of the computat ional complexity involved , Over these R 
replications. an aggregated mean deter.:tion rale, 5. i (k:r), over the enlire corridor for period K to 
K- i is r.:a!cula ted using equation 2 
(l) 
I/, ,(k} is tht: weight by the appropriate exposure times across all possibl~ COt\s (C,l ~nd b,' units 
, iz:e£ that appear on arc/nodesJ for C, 
The aggregated mcan det~ction rate. j,;(kJ), is lh~n used to ~ornpllt~ lC1e 
probability ofztro dd edions, D(k)=O, for a specific COA.. (C,l. using tht following Poisson 
probability distribution 
I'ID{k)=olC"q =~:: ,e - ; (3) 
f he probability of at least one detectio n, n(k) ? I , for n .ipecifw COA. (C,l, i.i 
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(4) 
The probability of alieast one detection for i\ specific eGA (C, ) is Iilulti plied by i:s 
prior eOA probability, and normalized over the sum of the other COAs (multiplied by thei r 
respective probabilities of at least one detection) to obtain the postnior eGA provability for that 
specific eOA Elluation 5 is used to calculate the likelihood of a specific eOA being Ilsed in a 
Type I situation, when there are no detections on any avenue of approach 
~(C,K " I) == ~':,:llol~L~'~:: ,I,:::~~~~ ) (5) 
'-- ~4"",-_ke-? 
where ;t(e, K) is the prior probabili/y for CGA C, and rr:(C,K --- I) is the posterior 
probability for eOA e 
In a Type 2 COA perception update, where there are detections on all avenues of 
approach , a [east Slluares estimate oflhe number of assets of type j at node N, hased on Ihe la lesl 
detection is given by 
(6) 
where n is Ihe number of nodes, s.(nj,k) are sensor ohservation~ ufassds oftypej 
at node N, during time period (/i/:",(/i---l)t..), and o~; is the variance of the error of the sensor 
observat ion The number of assets oflype j at a node, dllTing the time period . can be in:erpreted 




,'~,(k) ~ (8) 
collen'on of al l nodes Ihal might be occupied during tile pe,iod. fo, a sp~cif;c avenue of 
approach a The distr:butio:l is normal with mean 
and variance 
( i O) 
is the 
A particular e~A, C has a dis~ ri b ution o~the IOtal number of assets of type j at 
nodes '= l(a ,k) on avenue o!'approach a, during the time period [kilo (k + I )1'>.l.A,(a, k) 
where ~[a , i'} , o,: J is the normal den, ity function with mean '" ~( and variance = <:> 2 
The mean is obtained from rhe TOEs for the numbers and types of units using avenue approach 
r! for a specific e OA, e , The eOA perception is updated as follows 
2 1 
where n is the product taken over ~ I I avenues of appronch ~nd for all asset tvpe, 
amID i;; a normalization constant 
In a Type 3 eOA perception update where there h~ve been detection,; on ,;ome of 
the aven ~l es of approach and zero detections on others, the eOA perception is updateu ~s follows 
(U) 
where P,,(c,;u) and [1 - Po(c,(3)] ar~ the probabilit ies of7.cro detections in the set 
ofa\'enues of approach aand at least one detection in the set of avenues of approach (3 , 
rcsp~ctivc1y, lRef 16J 
eun~ntly , FTLM uses sensOJ observations to calculate the probabilities associated 
with a Group's (Division) composition (in terms of numbers and types of brigades out of the totn! 
brigade types available) The observations are then used to determine the eOA perceptions as 
discussed above, For example, in COAl ,NET [Ref 14], the total number of brigades in the 
scenario for Blue forces are five brigades (three Infantry, two Armor, and zero Mechanized 
i3 .2. 0}) Ifa sensor identifies a Group that has a composition of 12.2,0) (for example Group I- I 
(Ref 14j), there would be twelve possible hrigade composit ion, associated with it 
The probabilities arc then calculated for each possible composition as determined 
Ily the sensor observation, In thi s example, Groupl-I has a composition of 12,2.0] ilnd we would 
e"pect to see a higher proballility associated wit h this po~sible composition than with the (llher 
eleven . However, this may, or may not be true. depending on the ~CCllracy of the sensor 
observat ion. This method ofdetenninirlg the possible eompos;t;ons of units and associated 
probabi lities is adequate as long as the total number of brigades in any force does not exceed frve 
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or six When there are more than a w\al nfSlx brigades in a fOlce. the nunlber ot possib le 
cO I~lPosition ~ of brigades becomes unmar.ag~able 
II. A llri,ion 
The attrit:on model currently incn rpo~ated in FTLM is V~ IV rudinll~nlary The 
de, igners of FTUv) f~lt that the attrition resulls of theater level combat should not be the ?rimary 
concern oftiH~ model The emp hasis off'TL1I,.'1 lies in the im?lemer.ta tion of Ihe algomhms 
dealing with plannil lg. pe~ception. e ll filsion. surprise. and ai r - ground linbge However, a new 
FTLM version i~ being developed at George :\1ason University which has incorporated the 
ATCAL COS AGE attrition process, a mon: sophisticated attrition rnoJd [Rd !7j 
The initial aurition model in FTLM fOCllSd only on gf(l~nd - to·grou[\d and Jeep 
strike anrition . The attrition model used a logarithmic ftmction to adjudicaTe ground 
force-on-force combaL and an exponential function to adjudi(;ate deep strike attrit ion fhese 
functions were chosen for the initial attrition mo(~el in FTLJ\I bec,lUse they w~re computationally' 
sllnple, and produce somewhat realistic results Logistics, supplies, Jnd equ ipment arc not 
~t(rited, however, they arc consumed The function for supp ly depletion is b~seJ on t he usir'g 
unit 's rate of fire, combat powe" ar.d logistical strength C' I attrition is nOI cunent ly incorporated 
into the attrition model, but wil l be incorporated in the futllre [Ref 1-1, pg. 82-85) Subs~quent 
versions of' FIU.I ha\.e incl uded more attrition effects Currently. FTLM has ~roulld-to-air and 
ail -to-ground ~tHition In the next version of FTLvL air -to-ai, atlJition will be incorporated 
[Rer 18J 
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C. EFTLM: 1\1ODF:L DESCRIPTION 
I. Enviror1lnent of the modeL 
J)lIll1blHC 
(1) Ground Network The Ground network has been expanded and consists of 3 5 
physical nodes and 92 transit nodes. This is an expansion from the first gennation FlU''''1 of 16 
p!lysieaL and 25 transit node~ , [Ref 14J The originaL EELS variant calLed for more nodes 
however. due to hardware limitations and the computational complexity involved . this number 
was reduced. The physical nodes are all major cities. Both node types now have sensor reporting 
capability which provide reports for fusion in the C'l proces~ The ground ndwork iruerfaces 
with the sea network to facilitate amphibious assauhs. unit landings, and pre-positioned afloat 
operations The ground network al$o supports deep fires, described in a later section There arc 
three basic ground maneuver units Infantry, Armor, and Mechanized. Each unit is equipped with 
personnel. equipment. ?\..fLRS (Blue only), and ADA. There are a total of]8 Blue divisions and 
15 Red divisions 
(2) Air Nt"twork The basic air network has not changed from the first gt"neration 
FTL M. [Ref 15J EETLM has been modified to include aircraft carrier based i\ircraft and cruise 
missiles (Tomahawk. harpoon, and T ASM) in the network However, the carrier aircraft and 
cruise mi:;siles arc not incorporated in the Air Module algorithms: they are currently scripted imo 
tht" scenario, The strikes planned (aircrart, Tomahawk, and T ASM ) in suppon of the ground 
operation will either be executed in accordance with the planned schedule and configuration (if 
Red forces arc in control of the targeted node) or canceled (if Blue forces are still in control of the 
targeted node). [Ref 2J 
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(3) Naval Netwwk, The N~val network contains 7 plwslcal node,,, ~nd I ~ 
nnde, which a:-e imegrated ;nto the overall net\\ork The physica l nodes are Carrier Oper~tl:lg 
A l e~s (eVO A) Both [lOOt" tyves have sensor reponing (;ap~bi l i[y Nava l ships current ly h~ve ~[l 
][npaCl 0:1 COt\ percct'tions Addi[ionally, sensor repons on amphibiOllS ships pTovide 
mforillation for fusion in the c'l p:ocess All observation afar. amphibiOLls ship nO[ only carr ie, 
an observatior. as a ship, but also inc ludes aT' observ~tiO!, of ground force, (men and equiprneru) 
This pan of the observation is fused ir. the Cl process nnd atTects Ihe Derceptions of COAs The 
ground and sea networks interlace to faci litate amphibiOLIS assaults, unit inndil,gs. ~nd 
prt"-nositioned Jfionl There <I~e nine basic Blue ship types Aircraft c~rrier. Cruistr, Destroyer, 
Frigate, Landing J-Ielieopte: Assault (LHA). Landing Ht"iicopter Dock (LHD), Landing Ship 
Do~k (LSD ), Landing Ship Tank (LST). and Maritime Prepositiun Ship. These bas:c ship type, 
we'e chosen because they represent the b~ckbone oftodiiy'S and tomorrow's Nayy There me 
fnur basic Red ship types f\il-craft carrier. Crui~r_ DeSlroyer. ann Patrol BoaL The four basic 
Red ship types arc no! representative of the Non h Korean NJVY: however, th~y Jr-e usefu l for 
le,[ ing the nallal aspeCl.S ofEETUvL Each ship is cquipped with personnei. equipment, radar. 
and ADA There are a tota l of2 1 nlue ,hips and 7 Red ships in the current scena rio [Ref 21 
h. Coune of Action del'f<!opment 
(ll Ground Jnd Logistica l unit s Red has three viahle courses of action (CO As) 
All COAs involve a logistical build-up of supplies, well forward, to suppon a :llJss;ve olTc[1sive 
into South KoreJ Prior to the massive offensive. Logistical Units w; 11 arriye The Lo:;ist,c~1 
Units are scheduled to arrive at their re,peetive nodes at a rate which will insure JII requ i re~ 
logis tica l suppon is in !-,ositiol1 ( i~1 ground truth) by SIMTIME = 6 DO SIMTIME IS the 
2\ 
simulation time and it is kept by the imema l c1oc~ of the model SJldTllvlE i, initiJted at the 
beginning of the simulation. A unit of time is currently defined as one day, but can be easi ly be 
,edefmed 10 rc!1cct a more suitable time schedu le. After the Logistical Units are in position 
(SlII.'lT1M£ ~6(0), the combat units wi!! arrive Jttheir respective nodes and commence 
hostilities Red wi ll attack using a specified Red eOA at SlMTlt>1E = ()OO For example, tile 
intermediate objectives for Red eOA I are Seoul, Suwon, and the SLirrOlmding road ne twod.;: , 
with the final objectives being Kunsan, Taegu, Pusan. Kwangju, and l'o hJng, E~ch Red eOA has 
a single corresponding Blue eOA to counter il. The decision concerning whic h counter eOA 
Blue will use, and when it will implement this eOA . is based on Blue's perceptions of when Red 
will attack and which eOA Rcd will use. Blue's perceptions are determined by sensor updates 
generated from observations of Red logistical units and combat units The perception updating 
process dctermined by logistical un it observations, is descrihed in a later section, Blue mayor 
may not have accurately perceived Red's intentions and may not be prepared (t ime-wise and/or 
eOA-wise) to counter Red's offensive eOA by anack time, The ac\uallocations of all units, and 
details about each eOA are given in Appendix A The general concept of the operations for the 
Red COAs arc based on the origin~l FTLM Koreiln scenario developed by Karl Schmidt. but have 
been modified to suit the joint modeling requirement s. [Ref 14J A brief operat ional over view of 
ali (Red and Blue) courses of act ion are provided below 
(a) eOA I 
L RED eOA I [hi, eOA involve, a 15 Division altack along the 
western and eastern corridors. Al the commencement of hostilities, Haeju. Pyongyang, 
P'Yonggang, Wonsan, and Kosong wi ll all have three divisions (each with 4 Brigades) allacking 
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from t ~ei r r~sl-'ect ; ve locallom; !n Phase I , Divisions I. 4 , 7, 10, I .> will at tack frn[ll t h ~ i l 
resrec!iv~ noJes along the- western and eaSTern ~o lTidol's to se:ze the- following obiect 'ves SeClll! 
K,mbwa. C hll nchu n. ,\:lLmsan (Chorv.'onl, Kangnung (Kansong). Je-Spe-CliveiV In I'h~ se '2 
Divisions 2.5 , 8, II. I ~ (from Their respect ive Il oae<; anti s~me corrido:s) wi l! a!l~ck to seize- the 
fo llo wing obje ~ t i ve~ KOngjll , Wo nj u, T aejon, Suwon, Samchol. :'e-spe-ctive-Iy, 1n PIW.Se- :; 
Div isions 3 , 6 , 9, 12 , 15 (iiom their respective noJes a:la same corr:dorsl wil) alt~ck 10 seize t il<' 
follov.-ing objectives Kllnsan, Kwangj u, Pusan. Taegu, Pohan,£:, re-spective:v 
ii , BLUE COA I Blue conducts i-lIl re1y defens ive operat ions 
Prior to hostilit ies , Bl ue fo rces a re positionEd in rlep th 10 defenrl against a two PJongeJ attack 
(,ves te rn anJ ea')!ern COl ridOTs) from the nort h 
(b) COA2 
iRED COA 2. This eOA involves all II Division attack alo ng 
the western and central corridors At the conmlencellient o f hostilities , Haeju wi ll have 4 
Divisions, Pyongyang (5 Divisiolls) P'Yonggang (4 Divisions) and WOllsan (2 Divisions) Each 
Division has a ! ol~ l of 4 Brigades, In Phase I, D:visions !, 3, 6. I i (from their respeclive 
node<;) will attack a long the western anrl cenTral corridors IU seize lhe following obwctive- Seoul, 
:>>'! unsan, K unsan, W OIlJU, Suwon, .espectively. Divisions '1. 5, 12. 14 a.e held in reserve at 
I' yongyang In Phase 2, Divi~ions 2. 7. ~, 13 (from their ,espec tive nodes ano using ' he same 
co.r idO! 'l attack TO se ize the foll owing objectives Taejon, Kwan!lill , Taegu C hu ngju, 
respect ively III Phase J, Divisiolls 9 , 15 (fron; the-ir respect ive nodes and llsing the samE 
curridor~) ",iii attack to seiz~ the fo llowing object i ve~ PUS3:l . Poh~ng , rcspecTivelv 
ii. BLUE COA 2, Blue conducts purely defensive oper,1tions 
Prior to hostilities. Blue forces are positioned in depth to defend against a two pronged attack 
(weSlern and centr~1 corridors) from lhe north 
(c) COA 3 
RED COA 3 This COA involves a l :i Division attad.. along 
three corridors western. central, and eastern At the commencelllent of hosti lities. Haeiu will 
have 3 Divisions, Pyongy~ng (7 Divisions). and Woman (5 Divisions) Each Division has a total 
of 4 Brigades, In Phase I, Divisions 3. 4. 5. 10. 14 (from their respective nodes) will attack along 
the western. centraL and eastern corridors (0 seize the fo llowing objectives Seoul, KimhlV~ 
Chunchon. MUllsan (Chor-von), Samchok, resp~clively_ In Phase 2. Divisions 11. 12 (from their 
respeCTive nodes and using the same corridors) will atTack to seize lhe following ohjectives 
Suwon. Kongju. respectively . In Phase 3. Divisions 1,2.6.7,8,9,13,15 (from thcir respective 
nodes and using The samc corridors) will attack to seizc the following objectives Kunsan, Tat"jon. 
Wonju. Kwangju. Taegu. Pusan. Chungju. Poh~ng. respecTively 
ii. BLliE eOA 3. Blue conducts purely defensive operations 1'1;(1) to 
hostilities, Blue for,.;es are positioned in depth to def~nd against a th ree pronged aTtack (western, 
central, and eastern corridors) from the north 
(2) Naval and Marine Units The Naval COAs are held constant and support all 
the ground COAs in the same manner. within 3 specific nm vJria~t Betwee~ rurt v;Hi~llIs (case,) 
the naval COt\s are changed There ~re thret" variants. Case I. t"arly l\~v~1 invol vement . Case 2, 
IMe Naval invo lvement: and Case 3. Joint (simuluneous) Army-Navy invol vel11e~t , The Maline 
COAs are directly associated with the groUl,d eOAs The Malint"s land ami ,.;onduct their 
;, p]1 ro p:late ground eOA. A lirm '.atiOn ofEETLM is t h ~t The r-.:~,~ I 
A tempora,)' sol"tiol1 ofscriptiag lhe navai operalioo5 has heen ~jarted. [Ref 2] Th~ M~rine 
ground COAs ale de,cribed In Appcadi:-.. A 
Cumlll:lI1d , Cuntrol. Cu mmuniclltions, lInd Intelligellc~ 
u. CIJmmitment of.loilll Forces 
'\t a sTraTegic planning levei (National Co;nmanrl AUl horit v or Joint Chief of Slaif). 
ioin( operation, are tr.e demonstraled zhilily to rapid ly aien, mobiliL:e, deploy. and operate 
milit~!)· forces anywhere in tile world At presel1l, t.he decision of v.·hen to commit such forces is 
held at the Presidential level The key dement in force proj~ction operaTions is !i~b' 
commitmen: of forces The essential tradc-offis between projeCTing the joint force rap idl y, and 
proJ ec~illg it ",ith l he righ! mix ofcor:lbat power and resources to accomplish the m:ssion The 
1l1o:e time a lTf Commander has prior TO actua l d~p l oyment . the hetter prepared and tailored th~ 
force wil l be to meet the missioa Joint force, are intended to deter, or to strike the decisive blow 
again,t an att~ck"r , but are also prepared to conduct other missions Typical missions include 
estahlishment ofa lo d3lllen~ (air head or heach head line). seizure of an airfield or pon fa~ility 
biocking, reinforcing. defending, or attacking The EELS variant incorporates an algorithm which 
enab les EETLM to independently decide when to commit joint forc~s The algo rithnl is explained 
in greater derail in the Detection and Fusion section of this chapter By varying the ,il.e of the 
forward deployed units and the e~rly entry forces. the algoriThm provides the capabil ity to 
investigate (he 1l1inilllUill sil.e offorwaTlI tkpioyeJ unit s This will be left for fut ure investigation 
As stated in the : hesis a,sumptioas, any mi litary operation of ~igniflcal1t magnitude is gener~lly 
predicaTed hy a large amount of logistical build-up The algorithm \\,'ill foc\ls Ot1 tht logistical 
build-up to obtain information on numhers and locations of units With this information. eOA 
probabilities can he determined and fused into the C-' I process to support the decision of where 
and when to commit forces 
Ii, Two .• iI/ed perc,'ptioll 
FTLM currently calculates perception of (OAs for one side fhe opposing side's 
eOA is fixed. and the enemy does not use any perceptions to ext:cute its fOA The model also 
calculates The prohability associaTed with a G10Up'S (Division's) composition (in terms of numbers 
and types of brigades) That ft:ed the eOA pt:reeptions. FTLM docs this hy determining tile 
possible permutlltions of all brigades avai lable to the force. EETLM 1I1i0ws perceptions of eo As 
to occur orl hoth side~. The perceptions are initially driven by sensor reports on logi,tieal units 
once a deviation from the established status quo occurs In order to arrive at a starting point for 
the simulation, Red's eOA is predetermined . lIowever, upon furtht:r rdlnement of the model, 
Red's eOA need not bt: predetermined . Once the Red eOA has commenced, the Blue force is 
free [0 choose any one ofit~ three availahle eOAs to counter the perceived Red eOA 
Unit .Hm'cment 
Specific changes to FTLM, to facilitate EETLM are 
(1) Army units move on maritime assets and are landed at seapons (ground 
lfllerface) 
(2) Logi~tical units have been added to the model 
EETLi\.J allows these logistical units to move within their assigned corridors to 
spt:eifled physical node~ (objectives) These unit:>, as well as the cumbaT manellver units, lise a 
minimum cost algorithm which considers the shortest diSlance, perceived enemy locations, and 
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tacl1c~ 1 dimw lt\ to move from node to node [Ref PJ All unit llloyet~lenl (Logistic units , t\rm~ 
comb~ t units , ami Marine units) is now d~teclab l e on both physical and ([-ansi\ Hode, Sensa I 
observat ions contribute IC) the CI f,lsion process and eOA P("fcept ions Nava l and amphibious 
ships are also deltctable and contribute to the C'J fl.siC))l pro~e ss and impact on eOA perceptions 
Ii {)cre c/ion (/f/(IFu.\ioll 
( I) Transit nodes and Physical node, In it majnr regional contingency (MRC), 
such as Korea, the IOtal numbe! ofb.-igades size llni(s COLJ ld exc("ed 100 b[ i gade~_ EETUvl has 
the ability 10 detect C)1\ phys ical and transit nodes, and accommodate a IOtal force structUic of 130 
brig;;des in the model Tbe fusion and detecti01! proce~s remai ns the same, howeveT, EETUvl 
reCluires a dTtferent method ofcalClilating pe~mutations than is cu~rently being used by the first 
generation fTLM. EElU\-J uses the grOlmrltll.l lh !l llmber ofbl-iganes associated with the 
Group/D iv ision d'inlerest dS an upper bound_ and then tie'.elmines the possible ptrmutations of 
the types of brigades aYJilab l ~ The ,otal nllmb~r of pe~mlllations is mOI-e manageabl~ than the 
number ofpermlildtions prod:lced by FTLM, and provide, the s~me level ofiniormation_ From a 
n, ilitaIJ' pe r~peC!iye , il is reasonab:e to have some injo~mation ahout the enemy in the area of 
operation (theater) , A JTF Commander would have some prior intel ligence about the size and 
CCimposition ofDivisiolls FOI" an example of how the permutation i, actll~lIy calculated, refer to 
COAl NET in [Ref 14J In COAl ",lOT, Gro:lpl- I consists of two Infantry Bdes, two Mmol 
Rdes . and zero Mechanized Bdes, {2,2,O} The ground truth mmlb er of brigades P.sso~:~ted with 
(il0up I- I is four By oll1aining at l possib l ~ permutations of the three difre tell! lyptS ofbriil~dcs 
(Infant ."\-" Annor, Mechanized); we fi nd the IOtai number ofposs:b le brigade rermutat ions for 
Gloupl - J is 24, (1'. ,,) Again, from a militdry perspeC!ivc, it is not unrtao;on~b l e to cxp~ct a 
Jl 
Division to have three or four brigades, and to come from one of three major manellver types 
(InfanTry, Armor, or Mechanized). In this Korean scenario, the Group/Division size units wil l 
consist of a maximum offour brigades and will have only three brigade types ( Infantry, Armor 
and Mechanized) There are in exccss ol"(iO brigade units on both sides in th is scenario The 
maximum number of brigade permutations fo r any Group/Division will be 24, (P,') The large 
number of brigade units is required to demonstrate EETLM's abili ty to handle a more realistit 
theater size operation 
(2) Logist ic ~ 1 Unit Information and COA Selection The decision algori thm to 
commit forces, preceded by the algorithm assumptions, is outlined below !\ flow chart i.> giving 
in Apprndix B 
t\lgoritll1n Assumptions 
1 Suffi<.:ient logisti<.:al capability 10 support any of the Red CO!\s is NOT initial ly present 
in the area of in terest 
2 The Logisti~al Stockpile Rates arc the rates at wbieh logisti<.:al un it s increr.se in specific 
Meas of interest. These rates wil l incrcase over a shOrl period of time, thus eliminating the 
possibility of rates remaining within established normal deviations (oflogis(ic activities) 
3. Logistical Stockpile Rate will increase constant ly, on<.:e build-Up commences The 
constant rate results in a linear increase or total logist ical units over time Ifthc rate was not 
constant. then other techniques, such as multip le linear regress ion, or least squares would have to 
he used !O predi~t the increase of logistical units over time 
4 , The perceived Time of Attack wi ll be calculated, hy Blue. every sensor update cycle 
Once the difference between the perceived Time of Altack and Blue's response tillie is negligihle 
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(1t"5s than ~ flOwSl. tnt Perc~ivcd Time of Aaack is ndd constanl This i, re!erred \Q ~s dec is ion 
5 COAs perceptions w:1I conlinual ly be updated The Early Ent", Force >v ill deploy ~nd 
conduct t he eOA associated "'ill the el,e:ny 's COA having ~ht highe>t prob~bi l ity al decis ion 
5 Logisl ics LJ ni ts (logistics packages) are detectable in Brigade SLJPPO" sizt p~ck~ges 
7 One logistics ulli~ sLJ ppons olle gt"ntric briglldt" (tither Armor, M~chanizeJ, or 
lnlantry) 
8 Logist ics lmits will mov~ into the area of interest before combJt 
" Two COA probabilities will be I n~i nlail,ed One set ,,'il! be ckterminerl by logistics unit 
observa tions the other delerrnined by combal unit Qbser.'Jlions 
nasicAJgori thm 
1 ESlablish StalLJs Quo Ident ity t he d i strib~tion (mean and vMiance) of the comb~l uni ts 
(Brigade size), logi sti c~1 units (suffic ient logi stic, to support a Brig~de in combat for ont" week) 
and I ()gistic~ ratts of the nodes within the area, ofimereSI The nodes ;nlhe respeClive dfeas of 
in teresl Me determined by tht aOlalyst (they may fal l within a cert ~in distance or radi'JS, or Illty 
may he impO!ta:lt for other reasons, which are s itualion clepende!1I) 
2 Allocate st:nsors in fOUT spec i !i~ in tell igence req LJ ilt: :11enlS art:<!s 
(i) Logistics stockpiles 
(a) Class I and V support for one Hrigade in comb~t for oae wet~ 
(b) Side & Panel trailers, flat -heds. and low-boys 
(c) fuel carriers alld water traik r ~ 
)] 
(ii) ConSl1l.Jction assets, (i,e warehouses, bridges, roads, and defensive posi:ions) 
(iii ) lncrt:ased air activity 
(iv) Lnit /Troop Movemem 
'3 Deted deviations from establi,hed sta tus quo (e,g" an increase of one standMd 
deviation from norrnallogistics act ivity), The siLe and number of deviat ions required to activate 
action 4, below, is an input parameter, and wi ll be checked when conducting sensitivi t\' analysis 
However, once a deviat ion outside the prescribed parameTers is noted , the algori thm will proceed 
wi th the following steps 
4, Reset all rOA probabilities to cljually likely and increase sensor reporting This is 
necessary to reduce response time of th~ Ray~si an update process. Thus, the most recent s ~ns()r 
observations will have more significant and timely impact on COAs "pdares, without having to 
overcome the bias of tile initial perceptions (Figu re 1) 
figurt 1. Incrtast In Logistical Units 
Calcu late The Logistical Stockpi le Rates (overal l and individual node) and Time of 
Attack T he Logistical Stockpile Rates are calculated in a two step process First , the nvera ll 
Ln,';! isticai Stockpile Rate fo r the entire area of interest and Time of Anack must be determined 
To calculate the LogiSTical Stockpile Rate, over some time period, the total increase in number of 
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logist ical un;ts is found Dividing this overa!1 IOtal incre~sc by the time period prod ll ce~ an 0\'er~11 
Log istical SlOckpile R~te This ca lculated overall Logi<;(ical Stockpile Ra!e is used to dett" rill ine a 
time un til sufiicit"m logl,tics Uni ts wiil he available to support the perceiwo 11Iinilllllill f0 fces 
re~Ulred to conduct 2T1\' one Red eOA. This timt" wili be th~ pt"rceivcd time unti l ?ttad; (Ti me 01' 
Attack) III the second step. the individLial Logi st i c~1 Stockpil e Rates fOI e~ch node within the 
are~ of imerest are rtetermined, The methort for calcillating these rates is silJ1l la r to the ovn~ll 
tot,d increase, e;:;cept that instead 0fusing the tota l logistical unit increase for the entire area, the 
logistical un it increase at a particular node is used, and i, divideu by the uclta time perioo 
proullce5 the inoiv;dtl~1 node Logistical Stockpile R~tes fOI ea~h node in the alea ot imerest 
6, Update CO,\ probabilities using logi,tics unit ob,;erv'at!ons Militiplying the indi vid u2.1 
logi,tical Stockpi le Rate, for t"~ch node by the time L1nti l attack produces Ihe nUlr.ber of I3rigndes 
that each individual node will be ~apable of supponing at the Time of Attack. The nliinber of 
Brigades associnted with each node can then be IIseu to delermin~/tlrdate r robabilities for each 
eOA . The eOA probability used will bc the gr~~ter of the probabilit ies oetcrmineu by logistics 
unit observ'ations and bv combat unit observations 
7 The Decision The difference between the percei v~d Time of Attack and the respo nse 
timt" leq,:ired to pmvide suffi~iem forces in the~ter (Requirt'u Response Tim~) provides an 
interval of ueeision time The decisi0n to c011lmit joint forces is made once the difthence is zero 
rh~ requircu resronse rime can ~ I so be adjusted 10 reflect political cons;del-al ions (bot h domestic 
and imern~tiona l ) Sensitivity an~ !y sis will be conducted to uctcrmin~ the potent ial impaci of Ih" 
adjustment of the critical time on the out~ome of the e~rly entry opcr~lions A flow chan ant', 
example of this process are given in Appendices Band C 
(3) Indirect fire missions_ Deep indirect fire assets have the carabilill' to influence the 
battle before the close-in fight starlS, A greedy artillery fire mission algorithm ha, been developed 
and ImplemeTited to al low deep fires The closest uTiit tu the enemy that does not hale an I' jiri"g 
cOTistraints fi res the deei-' rllission Dcep fire s are rcstricted by reloading times. n~lI11ber afvol lev.'; 
and logistics 
Basic Algorithm 
I Docs unit have Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)? 
Is there an enemy unit on a physical 01 transit node which is in range') If su. the 
following clcments must be addressed 
a, A sensor must be allocated and be providing continuous observations un the 
enemyumt 
b Sensor must be capable ufassessing ballie damage 
c Range calculation- Once an enemy unit intersects the range arc of a MLRS 
firing uni!, the enemy becomes susceptible to !\1LRS fire ro calculate this 
If thc above conditions are lnle 
THEN A Unit fires MLRS at the targeted enemy unit 
a, A unit fires a total often 1vILRS volleys (I volley = 12 r.lLRS rounds) Then 
it must v.ait a prescribed time period before it can fire MLRS again 
b, Only one Blue Unit ftres on an enemy in one time pcriod An Enemy unit 
cannot be re-engaged unti l one time period later 
c Once the time period is uver, re-engagcment is allowed 
d If there are two, or more units in range of an enemy unit, the closer uniT fires its 
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MlRS fi rs (, then 11S requi[ed twO perIOd, The other lJ1~its. if st ill In 
aile t ime period has elapsed 
e. If there are two, or more enemy un!ts withill range tile closes( enen1\' un it is 
fl rea or. first, then the lle.~t ciesest enemy unit IS engaged 
4 . Lnits are net allowed to use up me ~e Than 50% of ~he allocated I'v1LRS ammllni(iOl; 
un less the ent"my ull i( is ;,~ an adjacent node, In this case. il il lay use up all MLRS Jillmunition 
urovid ing there arc wffleien( time periods available 
5 Amount of Attrition Once a unit comes into range, (he pereenlagt" of the Iln;, 
susceptible to the lethal effects of the round will depend on numher of rounds fI red A random 
number draw against a spe~iftc interval wil l specify Ih is pelcentage The intervals wii l correspO!1d 
to the number of (he round being f.red (for 1st rounds (or vol leys) filed the interval is 
(30%-50%), for 2nd rounds ftred tne interval is (40 ',;'-70%). for 3rd rounds fired O[ greater ' the 
interv2 1 is (60%-85%). The percentage increases as (he numher of rounds fired inerease~. but 
only to a maximum of85% oftne unit being susceptible to indirect fire attr ition Ad}udicarion is 
deter mined prio ~ to any close combat attrition so that deep fire effects can be;: rea lizt"d A flow 
chan orthis prucess is giver. ir.l\ppendi'( D 
(4) Sensor AJlocat ion Physical nodes will be prioritized and packaged intu sensor 
groups For Red, thc ,cnsor packages wil l correspond to the al!ack pha,es, and incorporate all 
nodes ir. each phast". Since thert: ale th:et: phases in Red 's planned operations, there will also be 
three sensor packages, each associated with theH rC'spective ph2,e (see the ground eOA SeC( lOn in 
Cllaplcr II for the specific nodes per phasej Each sensor package wi ll I:ave R specifit:d sC'lw'r 
obseTvat ion frequency associa~ed with it (High one scnsor observation every 6 how:; , or Low 
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one ,ensor observation every 1:1 bou rs) Generally. all sensor groups are in 10\\ sensor 
observation fre quencies As the Red for ccs progress th rough their operationa l ph~ses (sensor 
groups), the sensor observation frequenc ies corresponding to Ihe ne).:t phase (sensor group ) IS 
swilched from low to high, and the old group is <;wit~hed from high 10 low AI l oc~ting sensors 
ohservations in Ihis manner will allow Red to update its perceptions of Blue as the battle 
progresses. without add ing too much computational hurden to The model These perce~l i on 
updates wil l allow for Red's COA updates, movement route selection. and aircraft targeting 
priorities to be based on their most recent sensor reports. Since the majority of the Blue forces 
are already in country (stationary on a physical node). detec tion on transit nodes only occurs 
when the reinforcing forces arrive. Once those forces are in their respective defensive position 
(physical node,). thrre will no will longer be any detection on transit node, for Red Red's only 
source of intelligence will have to corne from ohservatiotl'i taken at physical nodes The ha,ic 
algorithm is as follows 
I Establish sensor groups (a node can he included in more than one sensor group) 
For each sensor glOup. assign fre~uencies for sensor observations to urdate 
perceptions (model inpuT) 
3 Initialize all sensor group frequellcies 
4 Sensor observations are conducted in accordance with the prescribed frequency of the 
sensor grour 
5. Sensor observation frequency oflhe ne'{l sensor group arc changed from low to high 
once 70% of the nodes in the current sensor group are occupied rile current sensor group 
sensor observation frequency is also changeu . but hom high to low 
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6 If a ReJ unil altacks a node not in the CUlren! sensor group and the cunen! Seli sor 
group is st ill not 70 % occupied, b(.Jl h sensor group s freq ucncy will be high Once the current 
sensol group fina lly reaches 70% its frequency wiJi be rcduced 10 Jow 




A. ISS UES FOR INVFSTIGATJON 
I . Im p:lct of Join t Operations on COA Per ceptions 
loint op~lations ale th~ integrated wilitaTy activities of two 01 mOle service components 
Army. Navy. Ail force. Marine Corps of the US mili ta ry [Ref 1. pg 4-1 1 The key to s'~ccessf~ l 
Joint operations IS synchronized employment of ground nava!. spec:al opt'rRtion forces, and 
space force s .[Rt'f I. pg 3-1 ] To investigate the impacT of the joint operaTions across each 
scenario entry case. the focus fo~ analys is of th is issue will be on the following arcas 
(L J'erceptiun Chn"r:es Ol'tr lime 
How do the eOA percept ions change over time? Does EETLM capture the eOA 
percept ion ch~nges when Joint operations are being conductcd'l Examining This is .iue would 
pfl)vide insight into joint operaTions 
b. COAI dllll'en 
Does EETLM choose the correct (OA, for bOTh Blue and Red') For planning 
purposes, knowing when and if an enemy is able to determine the co.rect eVA is crucial 
2.lmJlactoftime 
When flllI .I·/ the rieci.,i(Jn lu eommil joint furce .• be rllll/le? 
The decision of,,,.hen to cowment Join! forces is criTiclil . As stated before. the kev 
eieme-m in early ent!)' operations is tirrJ..rly power projection . However. rhe essenti,(1 mil: tary 
trade-off is between prOJccting the joint force rapidly and projecling it with the right mix of 
wrnbat power and resource, to lIccomplish The mission To inv~stigat e this question. joint fo rces 
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are committed in a re inforcing role, with the mix (force size) and tht: forv.'~rd dcploved force sizt, 
held constant The relationship between wh~n Joint forces are committed (the reinforcementide!ay 
wne) and the sile orthe forward deployed forces is directly proportional As the siz:e of the 
forward deployed forces decreases. the reinforcement/de lay time must deCTease. Varying the 
entry time ofjoim forces will allow investigation of the impact of the speed and timing on the 
commitment ofjoint forces 
h. Preposition fIjIOt/1 
The capabi li ty of having equipment pre-positioned afloat is modeled by 
incorporating the times required to deploy Prepo Afloat units The impact on the outcomes will 
provide insights on the deployment timing, and allow for study of the impact on eOA perccp'.ion 
J . Uscl'ulno:ss of EETLM to the JTF CommRnder 
a. I" the pJrlnlli"g phase olthe operation 
During the planning phase of an operation, timt: is crit ical All intelligence and 
insights availahle to the JTF Commander are used to develop courses ot actions and conduct 
intel ligence preparation of the battlefield (lPB). EETLM can provide the stafl' and JTF 
COllnnander with an idea of the potential outcomes of the COAs being considered . Weaknesses 
or flaws in COAs can he exposed , critkal events or times can be identified, and "what it" type 
questions can he explored, EETLM's scenario can be modified as different COAs are developed 
new forces become avai labl e, or objectives change 
b. Enrou/e lothe Illemer ol opermion 
As intelligence and insights become availab le to the JTF Commander EETU\.l's 
scenario can be modified to incorporate the new intelligence The model results can be analyzed 
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to provide the JTF Commanr.er with an idea of the po t e ~H i~ 1 ;nlp~ct5 eH, ~p E c; f1C [OA, Thi, 
c c.p~ b i li ty can be LJsed while enroute to tne t heatEr of operat ion. perminin ~ conr;r1Uou:; planning 
prio r 10 the op e,at:on 
SlrclIgrh /I'I'ef5 
( I) What were the strength leveis (comhat effectivcness levels) of~I I LJni t s') We~e 
th!."y above a minimum rhre5hold? Jf a unit held, dclayed, or achieved its objective. analysis oft i1 e 
combat effcctivem:ss icvel W itl give an indication of the cost associMed with do ing so 
(2) What was the time associated wi th the above level s? 
4. M inimnm required nllmberof forw:H'd ueployeu troop IInit~ 
As noted earlier. Ihis issue will he left for future invest.igaTion as d~scribed in ChdpTer 
IV For The p:lrposes of This thes is, the forward deployerl force 5i7.e will remain flxc d 
B. MEAS URES Of EffECTIVENESS 
1'0 adrlress the issLJes po,ed in the above section. the following methodology. m!."asures of 
d fect iveness (MOE), and ddta requirements will be LJsed, The methodology for analysis Df 
EETLM will fo(;us on two main areas perceptions ofCDA5 over timc and unit stlengths, T hese 
!WO analysis Hcas were chosen 10 demon,trate EETLM's unique capability of us ing J)crceptions in 
its decision making, and lO show the variability of outcomes. The second arca \\iJS chosen to 
demonstrate EETUvl's ab il ity to provide standard output fo r tradi tional for~e rati o ana lvsi, . and 
\0 again show the variabi lity aS50(;ia tcd with the outcomes For the f1~rposes (If this t!lesis. lar!!c 
nLJm bers ofrep licm ions will nm be run in order to produce a di5tribLJtion of outcomcs lor ~n aIYS1 S 
A large number of replications would a! low fo r the app li cation of the central limil theorem and 
SLJ nScflucm calculati ons of :llean values and variances of outcomes It would also allow for Iht' 
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performance of t-tests and other appropriate statistical tests 10 deleJlninc if anv st~tistical 
significant differences exists among the outcomes, This thesis will use the outcomcs of three 
replications to demonst rate that the model produces variahilitv in its outCOInes A d~ta source 
matri)';, out lining which data requirements will he U!;~d to answer specifiC MOEs. will he e)';pla:ned 
in detail in t he following paragraphs 
I. Trad ition al Comb;!t Analysis 
The traditional MOEs. listed below, will be used , to address the fo llowing issues thc 
impact of time (Issues 2 a and b) and the usefulness ofEETLM to a JTF COlllmander (Isslles ~ a 
b,andc) 
(s~~:~:s~~.n:~s;~~n % Remaining Farce Raliofor bOlh sidn 
(~~:,: ~': ::::) Lon Exchange Ratio 
( sf:::,=~,~,;;) % A;r Forces Remainingfor holh .\'ide ,~ 
(:,:',::%:::I,::,~',:J % f\' fll'Ulforces Rcmaining/or fmlh side,l 
What l'llIIse(f Ihe Theatcr Camptlign /0 be ,\/(J/i/iC(/? 
( I ) Did Red reach its objectives (all or somc)? 
(2) Did a side reach its breakpoint? 
Three replications of the base Cllse (Case 2, lat.e Naval involvement) will be conducted 
to ohtain a baseline. Recall the three Blue Cases: Case I . early Naval involvement, Case 2. late 
Naval involvement~ and Case 3, Joint (simultaneous) Army· Navy _ Ai r Force and Marine 
involvement 
Th~ data requirements for the respective traditional MOEs analysis are as fo ll ows 
These data requiremenls will be collccted in all three replications 
DR 1 Staning and Ending Strengths of Ground units for both sides 
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DR 2 Starting and EI,ding number of Air Force 2ssets ft,r both "ides 
D R 3 Starting and Ending numb~r of Naval forces for both si d~s 
DR 4 L ist ing oC al! II nit loca tion, (by node at end game) 
DR 5 Listing ()fthc combat and logi<;t iral strengtils ofalJuniu (at end game) 
1. Pl' l" crptioll Au ... l ysi.~ 
r ile perception MOEs listed below will be used to add ress the f() ll owing iss~es the 
adequacy ofEETLlvI to model a Jo int O peratio), (Issues la and bJ. tile impact of time (Issues:: a 
and bJ. and the useful n~,G of E ETl.lvI to a JTF ("o:nmat,d{'r ( Issues 3 a and 0) 
(/. lUue's perccplion of lhe thrce Rcd COA.'. gi,'cn fI Rcd COA 
h. Rcd's perceptioll ofthc thrcc lJIl/(' COAs, ;:il'clJ i1 Blu<' COA 
C. Rlllc 's pcrccplion of lhe IOJ;i.\tic IInil ralc il1creasc 
d. Blue's jH!rt"cpli()n ()f Rcd's fllTad rimc 
To ()btain data rOT tbe above MO b. 27 repl icat io;,s will be conduc ted (T hree 
rcpl:cati()n~ pel Side J's COA I, 2. and :i , and pel Blue E !"Itr)' Case (1 .2.3). over every senso r 
update cycle) T he data wi ll be graphed over time to disp lay changes in pe~ceivd COA>, the 
va riilbility betwten rep licat ions. and the impact orjo~nt opel at ions (Ca st 31 
COAX 
The dat a requil'ements f,x the perception ana lysis are as follows 
DR 6. Side i's perception of all th ree of Side eOA. given Side .i is conducting 
DI{ 7 Il.ed 's logis:ic uni t rate as perceived by Dlue 
DR 8 R.ed's attack time as perceived bv Bille 
DR 9 Blue decision (time) tor when to com mi t forces 
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3. Da tl! So urce l\"1atr icl'"S 
The data requirements outlined in Ihe two tables below will be coUected during each 
replical ion to IIlsure Ihat all MOEs and issues are addressed The first matrix (Table 1) associate, 
MOEs with the Data Requirement s and the second matrix (Table 2) associates MOEs with lhe 
Issues 
MOE 
I, Ib Ic Jd lei leii 2a 2b 2c 2d 
DR 1 X X 
DR2 
0 DR] 
A DR 4 
T DR 5 




TABLE I. D,\TA REQUI REMENT VS M OE 
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I . ISSL1[S 
i~ ~-I---'--I-'--: 2 I J I 
b 
---'-J b I , I b I ' I, I __ , I , I 
X X 
I Ib X X i -7-
I I , J X , , -
MO E 10 I , , -X-
I ri X X 
=:::] + f--- , I 
, X 
I X I jJ 2b X I X 2, X X X I I 2<1 I I X X X 
TABLE 2, MOr. VS ISSUE 
C. CONDUCT OF TilE SIMULATION 
l. Purpose 
The purpose ofth~ simul~tion is to obtain all the data requirements m:eded for the 
MOEs and issues in accordance with the nata source matrix A total of27 replications of 
EETL\1 were run three rep!ic~tions of the th ree Red COAs fo r each of the three Blue cases 
leady Naval and \1arine involvement, late Naval and Marine involvement, Joint (simu l tan~ous) 
Army, Navy, Air Forec , and Marine involvement) fleCaLlSC the prototype model is not fully 
mature at this lil11e (for reason, rie,Grilled lat~r), complete statistic~l aTl~ l ysis usin~ cO:1fidencc 
im"rval, derived from a large number ofrcplications is not appropriate for this thc,is Rathn, 
thr .. e replications wen: run to show the stochastic behavior ofEETLM More replications carl be 
nm, as discussed in the Chapter Vl, to investigate statistically significant di!Terences produced by 
smaller forward deployed force sizes and varied reinforcement/delay till]!;S rilese illVe,(i!o!ations 
wi ll be lefi for future research 
Z. Simulation Events 
The following events have been identified as being criti<.:al Snapshots of the ~imulation 
will be taken at these times to obtain all the requisite data re<1ui relllell!s 
(I. STARTEX 
STARTEX is the stan oflhe simulation Al STARTEX (SIMTIME = 00), the 
status <1uo will be aUlOmati<.:ally initialized and Red logistical build-up will commencc at a rale 
which wi ll insure all Red logistical units arc in position at SIMT1\1E ~ 6.0() All initial strengths 
will be fepo rted at this time 
h ATTACK TIME 
Attack Time will occur al SfMTlME '" 6,0 Red will commence the attack once all 
logist ical units afe in position (60 logistical units and SIMTIl\fE = 6,0) This is also thc beginning 
of ['hase I of tile operation, All Red combat ul1its \Viii start from one of fou r locations' Haeju, 
Pvongvang. P'Yonggang, Wonsan. aruJ/or Kosong . The actual violi\tion of tile Demilitarized 
Zone (DMZ) will depend on travel time fro m the respect ive locations All unit positions and 
eOA perteptions will be reported 
PERCEIVEI) ATTACK TIME 
Perceived Attack Time is the time Blue has estimated Red wi ll attack This time 
calculation is hased on sensor reports oflogistical units and combat units These reports are fused 
il1lo :he ('I proccss and a eGA is also determined as the most likely Red eOA at [lcrceived 
au ack time Once the difference between the perceived attack time and the required respon,e 
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(ime is zero. (ile perceived ~ttack tilne is iixed and ", iii nOl be s\;bse'luent lv updated TI ,t, dec;' ;on 
\0 comlll[t forces wil l be made alld fences wi ll start ingress The eOA choscn by Bluc will be 
reported 
,I. COA UPDA TE CYCLE 
The COA update cycle is an analyst input Currently. the COA update cycle is se t 
to O:1CC eve)" 6 hO ll T, . Ar eve~)' l.Ipda!e cyc le the fol lowin£ information is reponed 
• Perceptions of eo A, 
• Attacktimes 
• Float t ime 
• Logistic rales 
• Logist ic units totals (for both sides when applicable) 
• Specified ground Slrengths 
S URFACE-TO-SURFA Ct: ENGAG"EMEN TS 
For every engagemcnt, EETLM p~ovides the following information 
• Side 
• ;\lission 
• Start of mission 
• Time on targct 
• Target. Componcnt 
• \Vcapoll 
• Rou nd sflred 
• Strenglh (before and after engagement) 
l E:\'])EX 
E)\JTIEX is the termination of the simulation ENDE); occur, when one of !w(\ 
(I) Either side's ground-lo-ground ar.trit ion strength falls below 50%. or 
(2) Red has reached its fma l objective, Pusan, The final strengths of both sides and the 
posilions of all units are reported at ENDEX The EJ\TDEX conditions \~ere set by the author and 
may be changed 
J, Simulntion Limitations 
II. Attririrm 
The attrition model in EETlM is not fully developed The attrition model currenr ly 
in use is considered to be sufficient for this stage of development, In addition to an immature 
attrition model. the database consists of cntirely notional data All weapon capabilities and 
etTectiv~ness have been selected to avoid document classification problems Cause and etTecI 
relationships can be determined, but spcciflc outcomcs may be cntirely th~ result of data selection 
h. Limite(f Repficntitms 
As indicated earlier, three replications of each of the three Red eOA, over all three 
cases were run, The number of runs for this thes is are not sllfticient to statistically validate any 
conclusions The intent is to demonstrate EETlM's capability to provide analytical results Once 
EETlM is fully developed. the model will be more suitable for providing multiple replications i'lr:d 
J diSlfi\Jwion of outputs 
so 
The logi>ti::al huildup QC::U~~ over a shon interva l and at ~ eon,tant r~ ! e (6 days and 
at a r~le Qf2 log unils per day per node) Bec~use the time period is shon and the rate i, 
constant, ther~ mav not he 5ignif:eant variability ofattad: times, 11o ~t l ime, and log is ti~, ra tes 
betweer: replication, 
d. SU I/ario S"cci{ic 
Since only limited replicatior.s dTe p~rforrnec!> caution mt.:5t ;,e t.:;;~d to insure t ile resu lt> 
ohtained Hr~ not just ' scenMio specific" T ile results cou ld be extrerne values which ~re flot 
indicat ive of <lve rage be~avio r Obviously, a large nL1mbe~ ofreplic~tion5 shou ld be made wi th the 
mature model for nil actual study 
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
The reader is rem'nded th:!t the r es u l~ s ~nd thei r subse~uen t 
EETLM 'hing ~ f;et:tiou,; da tabase. The Ilctitious na[Uf!." extended to everY' aspecJ within the 
databJse, of panicular note numb!."r of units; size of :.Ini ts, cJpabilities; ST rengths, el!uipment 
types; attr ition , and logistic usage and re·supply rates, This was done ir.tentionally to avoid 
cl ass i fl~at io T1 problems The consequences ale lhat the results found may not he what one might 
intuitively expect. Additionally, EETLM is stil l a prototypc model ~nrl has not reached ful l 
matur ity, tnerefore not all algorithn:s are ful ly developed _ Some algorithms are ml':rely place 
holders. umi l more accurJte algorithms ca:l be developed ~nd/or implemented and more 
computa ' ional power becomes avai iable 
A. RrS UL TS 
The results aTe prest:lted in two sections [he resu lt s for the traditional combat analysis arc 
presel\leJ first . followed by the results for the perception analysis 
I. Result fo r Traditional Cornual Analysis 
rhe data requirements for each of the Traditional str~ngth and ra tio 1''I-'10£s, a, outlined i:l 
Chapter III. were collected and recorded in Tables G-l through (1· 3, in Appendix G. with 0I1e 
lable for each Red eOA The results displayed below in Table 3 R I·E 1 Results_ show Blue's 
strcngth leve ls (foJ Red eOA I, Blue entfY c~se I. rel-'li~,atioHs L 2, ~nd 3) and are part orT~b j e 
G- I. located in Apl-'er ldix G These results wi il be clisctlssed in de t ~i l The reader is refe rred 10 
Appendi" G for the remaining results 
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In case R I-EL Red conducted Red eOA I and Blue conducted entrv case I In all 
replLcations, Blue chose its Blue eOA I as its response eOA 
Table 3. Rl -El Re~ 1J1 1S 
Blue's ending ground strength was 64946 in replication I and 52523 in replications::! 
and 3 Blue started each rep lication with the same amount of ground strength, 202042. Blue's 
ending Logist ica! strrngth for repl icat ion~ 1,2, and 3, respectively. were 15744, 15 04 2, and 
15041 Blue started with 24700 logistical strength in all cases. Blue's starting personnel strrngth 
was the same for each case, 188500. Blue's ending personnel strength for replications 1,2, and 3, 
respectively, were 609l!9. 492 \9, and 49220. Appendix G (Figures G-4 through G- 12) also 
contain maps of the fmal end state (ENDEX) of the simulation wilh all unit positions indicated by 
replication, Red e OA ( I, 2, or 3). and Blue r nt ry cases (I .2 or 3), respectively In R I-E I, Red 
penetrated to Kunsan, Taejon, Taegu, and Po hang In replication 1, Red did h~ve one unit 
penetrate 10 Pusan 
2. Results for Perception Analysis 
The data requirements for each of the eOA perception MOEs, as outlined in ehllpter 
Il l, were collected and displayed in Ihe graphs given in Appendix H (Tables H- l through H-1R) 
The data collecled were graphed and displayed in sets by ground truth Red eOA and Blue ent!') 
case The tesults di,pl ayed below in Figure 2 RI -E I Perception Results. show Blue's perception 
of Red eOA 1 ~ nd Red's perception ofBlut: e OA 1 (lor Blue entry case I, replications 1,2, 
anrl :; ) ~ im lJlat i o n tinl;: in days is plotted a ll the X-~"is and Sl ,,~'~ Ptl,~~P t i (\ l l 
(probabil ity) ufRed eOA I, given R"d is ~ctual!y (;Q1,ducting Red eOA I. is plotted on the 
Y-ax~s (T he appropriate ~ide is ploued on the Y axis fOf Red 's percept ion of 81Lle) T he~e ,e.,ults 
will be dis(;ussed in de tail. Tbe readt:r is reft:rrtd to Apptndix H fO T Tht: rtmaining res" l ~s 
Figurt 2. Rl ·E J rcr~rption R("~ u[ ts 
In ca~!." R l ·E 1. al l eOA probabilities st~n out at eC] lI dllv likely, r ~ 0.3333 Bill!."', 
percepT ion o f Red e OA I staytd consistt:T1 tly high aCiOSS r",piicatiollS ~nd throughouT thc 
~!mu latiun, exc"'pt It)!" one dip at SIMTIME = 5,25 . Red 's percepTion of8tu", eOA I also started 
at eqllai ly lik!." ly, but dropp!."d to near lero, anoss all ft"pli(;a tions, from SIMTI\1E = 2 0 to 4 0 
After t h~l point. Red 's pe[c!."ption steadily increased 
T he I-esuits displ~yed bt" low In Figure 3 R I-E I Perct"ption ResuIT'\, 5ho"I' Bill e's 
perception of all Red eOA, (fol- Blue entry c~se 1 by rep lication_ only) a"d Red 's perc~p t ion of all 
Bille eOAs_ In Figure 3, simula tion time in day, is plotted onlhe X-axis and BllIt"'s pt"r(;eption 
(probilbiliTY) of all Red COAs are plot ttd on Ih~ Y-axis ([lit" apPJopriate side is plotted on the 
y ~xis tor Rt"d 's ptrct"ption of Bille) These resul ts wil l b", d iscussed in dt"tall The reader is 
r et~rred to Append ix H fer :he r",ma ining resu lts 
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Figure 3. RI-EIl'ereeption Results 
In cast R I-E1. all eOA probabilities stan out at equally likely. P '" 0.3333. B lue's 
perception of Red COA I stayed consistently high throughout tht simulation. except for one dip 
at SIMTThfE "" S.2'i. Blue's perception of Red eOA's 2 and 3 were generally the smaller of the 
three Red 's perception ofBltJe eOA 1 also started at equally likt""ly. but dropped \0 near zero 
from SIMTlME = 2 0 to 4 0 then steadily increased until it became the dominant eOA at the end 
of the simulation. Red's per~eption of Blue eOA 3 was dominllnt until approximiHcly SIMTllvlE 
= f) O. at that point Red's perception switched to 13luc eOA I Red perception of Blue eOA 2: 
remained the lowest throughout the entire ~imulation 
fhe data requirements for ea~h of the logistic perception MOEs. as outlined in Chapter 
Ill. were collected and displayed in Ihe graphs given in Appendix I (Tables I-I through 1-9) The 
data collected were grouped and displayed in sets by ground truth Red COA and Blue entry case 
There was very littlc. if any. variation of logistical perception lJelween Red eOA. Blue entry case 
and replication. The only differences _vcre f(>lmd in cases R l-E I (perception ofattac~ time. only) 
and Rl·El (all Logisticall\il0Es) Blue's perception of Red 's attack timc asymptotically 
approached the true Red atlack lime ofS!MTlME = 0_0 Rec~1I that attack time is determined 
when Red has sufficient logistical units to support an offensive atlack Blue's perception orits 
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110m tilile weill to leTO at J?proxi lll,:tely Sli'dTLlvlE ~ .3 Blue';; peJceplion or Red" 1 [1 ~ i5 Iical 
flo\\' was sl ightly iower than Red 's. J, was 8 iue 's p~rception of Rerl's logi,t:cs rate HCl\\ieVer 
Dlue', perceive logistics raTe aSVl11ptot i c~liv approached Red s actual rate 
n. A~ALYSIS 
Thi~ an~ l ysis fol lows the same organization as described above The analvsls i, addresse rl in 
two sections The ana lysis of the lrarlitional combat MOE"s is presented flr5L followerl by the 
analysis of l ile perception 1\.10E's. The anJ lyses oflhe trarl itional combat MOEs will he add ressed 
by Red eOA acoss all Blue entry cases, The COA perception anaiyses wi ll be addressed by Blue 
en!ry case across ail Red COAs. Al l llllllleric analyses ale included in the appropria te appendi~es 
I. Alialysis orTrilditional CornbM i\-'10E'~ 
The ITaditional analysis considers rivc MOEs. as described in Chapler III Each ,\10E is 
Jddl es,ed inrlividllally Within each MOE, three strenb'1h~ - Ground-lo-Ground attri tion, 
Logist ical. and Per<;onncl - is includd in the JnJlysis. ln general , Ihe ground-IO-ground attri tion 
strength and personnel strengths produced counterintuitive results for reasons discussed in the 
next section. whereas the logistics <;lrength comparisons were reasonable These results Me 
presented in detail to give the reader an appreciation of the MOE analyses possible from EET LI\1 
The results ar~ given in Appendix 1. TJbles 1-1 through J-X Future refinemem, of the model Jlld 
dJta wi ll produce more accurate re,ults for these MOE, 
% Blue ForCt: Remain;n!: Rill;/! /\JO£ 
(I) Ground -Io-Ground Attrition Strength Figure 4 graph i c~ l l y depict s i l1 e 
averages of the Ending Blue Ground-to-Ground Attrition Strength div ided by the Start ing Bille 
Grolmd-IO-G~ound Attrition Sncngth for Red eOA I acros, eaeh oflhe three entry ~.Jse~ The 
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aver.1ge ground-to-ground attrition strt"ngtli is planed on the Y ax is and tile three ent!\ ca,e, Me 
pl01led on the X axis. Thio; graph dernoflStrat~s the differenccs. b~t"een the joini entry case.,. of 
the remaining ground -to-ground attrition capabilities of Blue 
Figure 4. Ending Blue I Starting Uluf Ground-To-Ground AUrition St rength 
For al l three Blue entry cases. Figure 4 shows that the average siz:es of Blue forces 
at the end orthe simulations wer~ below 50%. The spe(;ifie values for each entry case are given 
in Appendix J. Table J-] . In entry cases 1 vs 2 and 2 \is 3. there w~s a sig'lificant difference 
between the remaining Blue Ground-to-Ground att rit ion stre!lgth sizes There was not a 
significant difference between entl)' cases 1 \IS 3. In Blue ent ry case 2, the remaining Blue force 
size was the largest In this case, the smaller Blue force (only tht" forward deployed fo rce) wa, 
able to stop the larger red force without allowing any significant penetration into South Korea. In 
tht" other twO Blue entry cases. Blue had a much larger ini tial force (forward deployed forces plus 
the joint reinforcing forces), when Red attacked, but Blut" was not ablt" w stop Red'~ penetration 
(~ hjs issue will be addressed in further detail in the Fina] Objective MOE) Thi, !esul! wa, 
Becallse the sma(ler Billc force was able to stop tht" larger Red force, the la te 
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arlivir,g B!Ll e joint reinforcing forces were nOi in the b~t1le ~ s long and. therefore. did not recel\C 
as many ~asualt i es This wOLl ld have al lowed Blue entry case 2 10 have a iarger ending strength 
However, the smaller in:lidl force size and th~ late arrival ofjoiTlt forr.:es wou ld have given Ihe Reo 
forces a larger ground - lo-grcul~d ~IlJ il ion ~dvdnlage over Blue for al leasl lhe first t\VO d~v, of 
the contl ici and allowed Red to altar.:k lhe Blue fo rces in piecemeal and without the benefit of 
Naval Fire Suppon (Air and TLAMs). Marine amphihious assault forces. and Armv follow-on 
]'repo alloat forces. This should have allowed for greater penctration into South Ko rea and more 
c<~su a l l i es on the in iti al Billc for;;c and subsequen!ly em the joint reinforcing forces. as comp,lrco 
(0 the other two Blue entry cases 
This result rnay have been caused by the rudimenlary a~trition model currenl ly b~ing 
used in EETLM and the ficlitious database. The database does IIOt accurately re:'1ect Rtlr ilion 
strengihs for bot h sides. and thi s inaccuracy 'nay have allowed Red to have more attrition effect 
WI the joint forces than it rea listically shouid have. If a bette! attrilio n model wcre employed 
more reasonable attrition resu llS wouid have r.een produced. Once the ATCAl - COSAGE 
attrition model li nd a more suitable databas~ are incorporated III EETLM, the results should 
reflect the benefIts of Joinl operations. These re'liits mav also be due to an ina(;curacy within the 
computer code and/or a combination of al l the above This counterintuitive reSlllt wns funner 
investigated by graphing the avelage grOlJnd-to·ground att rition, personnel. and logistics st rcnglhs 
for the K l-E I and R I-E2 cases The reS Lllts ~re given in Appendix J. Tables .1 -7 ~nd .1 -8 In 
Appelld;x 1. Table J- i . the R I·EI g~aph . the personnel ~nd grou!ld-to·ground at!ritio~ strengths 
do nOI behave as expecled Doth these strengths shou ld not Iwve had as ~teer an attrit ion ~ I ope 
~s compared to the K \ -[2 case However, both have.1 steep slope , indicat ing Blue was attrited 
by Red at a higher rate This result means thattht: same size Red force W~" able to amite a larger 
Hlue force (Rl-EI) faster than it did a smaller Blut: force (RI -E2l Addilionallv, in both R l- E I 
and R 1-£2 cases. t he ground-to-ground amitior: . personnel. and logistical strcngths staned OUI ar 
the same level In rhe R I-E2 case. th e- initial force size should havt: bet:n subslmllially less tbn 
that of the R I-E] case ~nd as a rcsult all strengths should havt: been substantially smal ler as well 
In Appendix J, Table J-8. the average combat scores for RI -E l and Rl -E2 were grap hed together 
for comparison Tahle 1-8 dt:ffionstratt:s the difTerence in slope between entry cases In this 
p~n i cu lar gr~ph Rl-E2 ends before Rl-El, but in general. all other t:ntry ease~ t:nd at 
approximately Ihe same time and produce the samc results. These results seem to indicate there is 
a problem with the stopping nlles of the simulatioll and with the attrition model T ilis wiij he-
~ddressed later in this cilapltr 
In Red eOA 2, across all entry cases, the results were similar 10 the results of Red 
COA I Blue entry case 2 produced the most casualties. as comp~red to the other Blu e entry 
cases These results ~ppears to be counterintui tive far the same reasons. The graphs are located 
in Appendix J, Table J-2 
In Red eOA 3, the attrition was approximately equal across all entry cases. Here 
again, Blue entry case 2 should have produced marc (;asualt ies, as mmpared 10 the other Blue 
cmry c a~cs, bul did not These results are also located in Appendix J. Table 1-2 
(2) Logistic Strength Figure:; depicts the averages of tile Ending Blue Logistic 
mength divided by the Starting Blue Logist ic strength for Red (0,\ 1 across each of t he th ree 
entry cases. The average logistical strength is plaHed or. Ihe Y axis and the three entry case, are 
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ploned on the X J'(!S This graph t!emonslrates the differences. between ~ he Joint cntry cases, of 
the remaining logistical capabil ities of Blue 
Figure 5. Ending Blue ! ShIrting HlIlC Logistic Strength 
FOI- all three Blue cntry cases , figure 5 ,hows lha t thc aVCl"Jge magnitudes of Blue 
logistic ,t rength at the end oflhe simulation, were aptl roximate ly e'l ual and wele slight ly abov~ 
~O% , Th~ specifiC valucs for each entry case :Ire givel' iI' Appendix J, T~ble J-3, In all elltry 
cases, there was nOI a significant difiCrellce bc:ween thc remaining Blue logistic st,eHgth, Thesc 
leS Ll lts are intuitivcly correct, since a smaller force (the forward deployed forces) would have a 
larger logistics usage rate per uni~ compared to ~ I~rgel force (t he rorv .. ard dep loyed forces ~[Jd 
the joini forces), Howcvcr the la rge force , since it inherent ly has Iltore units, would have used 
more logistic" In the end, t he overa:! logistic Ll s~ge coulo be e.'pecteu to bc the S~llle, or clo,e, 
thus the remai lling logistic levels could be c..;pected to be the same 
In Reo COA 2, aero,;s ail em r\' cases. Ihe average logis tical "Irengths were 
aptl Jo;>;lmatciy the same and were all avove the 50% level Bille enlry casc two. the late an;vai of 
joint rorr es , had a ;; Ii ght ly ;;mallcr logistical strength. Thcsc results are give" iI' Appt"ndi ;>; J, 
T~vle J-4 
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In Red eOA 3. across all entry cases, the results were simi lar 10 Red eOA 2 All 
t:ntry cases were above <;0%, and were c1os~ in strength levels. IJ lue entry case two had the 
smallest logis tica l strength level of the three entry cases These results arc ~Iso given in 
Appendix J, rable J-4 
(3) Personnel Strt:ngth Figurt: 6 dt:piets the averages of the Ending Blue 
Personnt:! strength divided by the Starting Blue Personnel st rength for Red eOA I, aero,s each of 
the three entry cases. The average personnel strength is plotted on the Y axis and the three entry 
cases are plotted on the X axis This graph deillonsti-ates the difierenct:s. between the Joint entry 
cases. of the remaining personnel strcngth;; of Blue 
EnlryC."", <,3 
Figurr 6. Eliding Blue I Starlillg Blue Personnel Strellglh 
For all thrre Blue entry cases, f igure (j shows that the average sizes of Blue fo rces 
m thc t:nd of the simulations were below 50%,_ The spedfi e values fo r each rntry casc are given 
in Appendix J, Table J - ~ . 1n t:n lry cases I vs ::' and 2 vs 3, there was a significant difference 
betwcen the remaining Blue Personnel st rength sizes_ Tht:re was nol a significant difference 
between entry cascs I vs 3 In Blue entry case 2, the remaining Blue pe-J'sonne-I ~1 J'e ngth size wa, 
tht: largest These results mirror~d the results of the ground-to-ground attrit ion, as onc ...... ould 
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intuitively e"p~c l CO~lbat attrition]s h]ghly d~pe[ldent on Ihe number of personnel, ~nd t hese 
rcsu lts illdi~a le that the attrition process i, ~ffecting bo! b paramcter, in the ,~me manne~ 
However_ both reSll l!s were cO]1nler:ntLJitive, as e"p:a incd inlhe grou:1d-to-groLJnd 
The rCSLJlts from Red eGA 's 2 and 3, across al l Hlue entry case>, also fo llow the 
grouna-to ground att~ilion resu lts and a~e givcn in Appendix], Tahle 1-6 
Red F(,rcc flemainin;; flal;" ,HOE 
(I) Gmund -to-Ground Attrition Strength. Fir,u:t 7 g:rap~l i cally depicts the 
~ ver!1.ges of rhe Endm£ Red Ground-to-Ground Anri!io:l Strength dividtd by the Slarting Red 
G round-to-G rou:1d Attrit ion Strength for Red eOA I , across each of the three e:llry cases, The 
ave:age grOU:1d -lO-ground attrit ion strength is plolttd on the Y axis and the th ree entry cases a:t 
plo, ted 0:1 the X axis Til is gr~ph d emOnSIr~les the difl"rren~es. hctween the joint Entl)' cases, of 
the remaining grou:1d-to-ground attrition ~apabilit i tS of Red 
]7igur~ 7_ Ending Red , St:lrting R~d Ground -To G round Attrition S trength 
Fo r all tkee Blue ent ry cases, f igu re 7 shows thatlhe a"eagc sizes ()~. Red ro 'c~s 
at Ille emj oftht: simulat ions were a ' , or below 50% The spe;;iflc vd l u~, for each Erltl)' case ale 
given in App ~ndix J. T~ble J- I In entry cases ; vs ::> ilrld 2 vs 3, there was a signifi cant (iiffel-ence 
betwec:1 lht: renlaini ng Rd Ground-to-Ground ~nri\ior1 strength sizes There- was riot a 
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signiflC iint difference between entry cases I vs 3 1n Blue entry case 2. the remaining Red force 
size was tile SlnJ lles l. These resuits were consistent with Blue's ground-to-ground attrition 
strength results, however, they were counterimuitive for the same reasons The second Blue 
emry case had the late arrival of the joint forces. The late arrival of joint forces should have 
plOduceu a larger remaining fo rce size thcn the other emry cases, hecause the defenders (the Blue 
forward d~ployed ground forces) were without the benefit of Naval Fire SUPPOT1 (Air and 
TLA/I,·ls), Marine amphibious assault forces, and Army follow-on Prepo afloat forces fo r ~ t least 
two days. This woulu have given the Reu forces a larger ground-to-ground attrition advantage 
over Blue for at least the first two days of the conflir.:t. as compared to the otiler two Blue entry 
cases As previously discussed, these results may have been caused hy the rudimentary attrition 
model, the fictitious database, and or the unverified computer code, currently being used in 
EETLM Once a better attrition model is incorporated, fUT1her investigation is warranted 
The results from Red COA's 2 and 3, across all Blue entry cases. also follow the 
Blue ground-to ground attrition results 
(2) Logistic Strenb>1h. Figure 8 depicts the averages of the Ending Red Logistic 
strength divided by the Starting Red Lugistic strength for Red eOA 1, across each of the three 
entry .:ascs. The average logistical strength is plaited un the Y axis and the three emry' cases arc 
plolted on the X axis This graph demunstrates the differences, between the Joint entry enses. of 
the remaining logistical capabil ities of Red 
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Figure 8. Ending Red ! Stnrling Rt·d Logislk Sln·nglh 
for ~11 lhree llI ·ole emry cases. Figure 8 shows that lhe Jverage sizes of Red logistic 
strenglh at the end of the simulations were ahove 65%. The specific values for e~ch emry case 
art given in Appendi~ 1. Table 1-3 In entry cases I and 3. the remaming Red logistics s:rtngths 
wt"re t ~le highest. in eillry case I vs 3, there was not a significant difi~rellce betweenlhe 
remaining Red logi5tic SHength sizes There was a significant rlitfere rJce be'.wt:en entry ca<;es I vs 
:'. and.2 vs 3 These results wer~ cons!stenl with the results orRed s ground-to-ground all! iti o~ 
strength results In ~nt ry case, I and 3. Reu had less ~ltrition and. conseC1u~n t ly. had not fO\Jght 
as hard. lh~reby using It:ss logis tics Howt:vt:r. these re,ult,; wer~ collntcri~lll it ive b both t:ntry 
cases I and J, ~he Red forces faced a larger Rille force and should ~lave intu itivel y had to fight 
harder, and used more logistics than in entry case lWO (late arrival of Join t forces, and 
conse~ uent l y . a smaller Rille force for at least the firSl two dnys) SinCt: tiJese resuil s were 
cO rJsis!em . it appears that tht rudi,nenlary 10.l;lst ics model current l)" being u~cd in CETL"-'l is 
produc.ing reaso nahle results 
In Reu eOA 2. across all entry ~ases . Ihe average lo~is ti ca l strengths were 
applOximately the same and were all above the 75% level Rlue entry case lwO . the late arriva l of 
6.1 
fo rces hao a slightly larger IcgislLcal strength These results ~re given ill Appt:l1{J i,.1 
Tablt:1-2 
In Red eOA 1. across all entry cases. the results wen: sin;ilar 10 Red eOA 2. All 
entry cast:s wcn: above 65%, arid were close in strength levels. Blue entry <.:ase two hatl the 
smallest logistical strength level of the three entry cases These results are also given in 
Appendix J rable 1-4 
(3) Personnel Strength Figure 9 depic ts Ihe averages oflhe Ending Red Personnel 
strength Jivided by the Starting Red Personnel strength for Red eOA I . across each oflhe three 
entl)! cases The average personnel strength is plotted on the Y axis and the three entry cases afC 
plottcd on the X axis This graph demonstrates the differences. between the joint entry cases. of 
t he remaining personnel strt"ng ths of Red 
Figure 9. Ending Red I Starting Red I'ersonnel Strength 
For all three Bille entry ~ases. Figure q shows that the average sizes of Rea forces 
at the end of the sin:ulations were below 50% The specific values for each t"ntry case are given 
in Appendix J. Table J- 5. In entry cases I vs 1. and 2 vs 3. there was a significant difference 
between the remaining Red Personnel strength sizes There was not a significant difference 
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ile rweenent:>'cas{"s I In Blue entry case 2. (ill' relllail11ng Rcd r~JSonnei sttength size was 
rhe Sll1all~sl. These rtsli its we'e ~gain consistent with R<o:d's grollnd-IO-grollnd attrition strcngt h 
r<o:,:_ilts , however, theyl,vere sri lJc oumerin(lJirive The o:planationofThe<;e resulr,i, The sal1,e as 
the Red ground -to-grou nd attrit ion strength resulTS, The r~s u l t, fro m Red eOA's 2 2nd 3, ,leros, 
all Hille entry ca, es, werr. also consi,tenT \\'jt h their respect ive Red, ground -to ~rounj ~llrillon 
r~sults , given in Append ix 1. Tahle J ·6 
Lon ExdulIIgc Ratio MOE 
(1) Ground -~o-Groll nd Attritio:"i Strength, Figur~ 10 depicts the averages of the 
Ending Blue Ground-to-Ground AttriTion Strength divided by the Ending Red Ground-lo-G round 
Att rition StrengTh for Red eOA 1, aCtoss e2ch of the three entry cases The average 
?round to-ground attrition ,trength is plo:ted on the Y axis and the three entry cases are piotrd 
0:1 l he X axis, This g raph demonsttates the diITer<o:nc<o:s. Ddw<o:en the joint <o:ntry cases. of the 
~emain i ng ground -to-ground attrition capabiliTies of Blue as compared to Red Va lll<o:g greater 
!lrJn 1 0 ind icate that Bille's Ending capat:iliti<o:s wnc more than Red 
figu r~ 10. Ending Blue / Ending Red Ground -To Ground AtfritiOTl Stn·nglh 
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for Blue entry cases I amI 3. figun." I 0 shows tha t the IIverage size, of Blue forces 
al the end of the simulations were less than Red . In entry case 2, the average Blue force size at 
the end oflhe simulation was greater than Red . The specific values for each entry case arc given 
in Appendix 1, Table J- I, In entry cases I vs 2 lind 2 vs 3. there was a ,ignifitant difference 
hctween the remaining ground-to-ground attrit ion Slreni,'1:h SileS There was not a significant 
diffe rence between entry cases I vs 3 These results were consistent with the results from the 
Biue and Red aurition strengths, but again were cO Ui llerintuitive as discussed previously 
The resu lts from Red eOA's 2, across all Blue el1try cases. were also consistcnt In 
th is Cllse, Red's ending force sizes were larger than Blue's across all entt)' Cllses 
The results from Red eOA's 3, across all Blue elllry cases, were also consistent In 
this tase, Red'!; ending force sizes were smaller than Blue's across all entry cases The results are 
given in Appendix J. Table J-2 
(2) Logistic Strength Figure II depicts the averages of the Ending Blue Logistic 
strength divided by the Ending Red Logistit strength for Red COA I, atross each ofthc th ree 
entry cases The average logistical strength is ploued on the Y axis and the three entt)' cases are 
plotted on the X axis This graph demonstrates the differences. between the joint entry cases, of 
the remaining logistical capabilities of Blue as compared to Red Values gr~atc r than 10 indicate 
that Blue's Ending capabilities were more th~n Red 
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Figure II, Ending Blue / Ending Red Lngistic Strength 
For ai l three Blue t:nt]'y cases, FigUle 11 show5 that tht: av("ragc ' ;7.es of l3I lle 
logistic strength at the end orlhe simulations were greater than Red Biue cmry case:1 ploduct:d 
tile largest remaining Bluc iogist:c stlength as comp3!ed to Rcd. The specific va lues for each 
entry case arc given in Appendix J, Table J-3. In all ent ry cases, there was not a sig!:ificant 
difference hctween the remaining Blue logistic stlength sizes. These results WCI(" intuitively 
correct, since in both entry ca,es 1 anJ 3, the ReJ forces faced a larger Blue force and woulJ have 
intuitively had to u>c morc logistics, possibly resulting in a larger Bille ending logistical 5trength 
In the end, the overa l! logistic usage could be expecled to be the same Of cios(", which:s the case 
for al l ent ry cases 
The lesuits from Red COA'5 2 and 1, across an Blue entry cases. were similal All 
Blue's eliding log i sti~a l 5trengths were greater than Red's Thc difference between Red eOA I 
and Ren eOA I and 3, was in Bille entry case 2. In Blue entry casc 2. Blue's logistica! strength 
levels were slightly smaller Ihan in entry cases' and 3, but as previousl y ment ioned were sl LI I 
l"rger thall Red s The results are given in Appendix J, Table J-4 
(3) Personnel Strength Figure 12 depicts the averages orllle Ending Bille 
Personnel stn:ngth divided by the Ending Red Personnel strength for Red COA 1. across each of 
the three entry cuses The averuge personnel al1rition strength is ploued on the Y axis amlth~ 
three enl!)' cases are plotted on the X axis This graph demonstrates the difierences, betw~en the 
joint entry cases, of the remaining personnel strengths of Blue as compared 10 Red Values 
greater than I 0 indicate that Blue's Ending strengths were more than Red 
~End I Red End Strength I 
r",,,,,",,,"sv~t1\j(n I 
Figure 12. Eliding Blue I Eliding Red Personnd Strength 
For Blue entry cases I and 3. Figure 12 shows that the average sizes of Blue 
personnel strength at the end of the simulations were smaller than Red. In Blue entry case 2, 
Blue's average personnel strength size at the end cflhe simulation was larger than Red The 
specifiC values for each entry case are given in Appendix J, Tahk J-5 In entry cases I vs 2 and 
2 vs 3, there was a significant differ~nce between the remaining Blue personnel strength sizes 
There was not a significant difference between entry cases I vs 3. In Blue entry case 2. the 
remaining Blue personnel strength size was the largest. These result s were consistent with the 
results from the Blue and Red personnel strengths, but again were counterintuitive as discussed 
previou~\y The explanation ufthese results is the samt'" as the ground-to-ground allrition and 
personnel strength results 
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Tilt rtsults from Rtd eOA's 2. acro" ali Blut tilt:>' cases, wtre also consi,tent In 
thi, cas~ . Red's ending personnel sizes were la rger than Blue's anoss ali t nt ry cases 
The results f!Om Red eOA's 3. aeros.> all lillIe ent ry cases. Wnt also consi,tent In 
thrs case. Red's ending personnei .>izes were sll 'al ler than Blue',,> across al l ent:>' case, The results 
are givt;] in Appendix J, Tahle J-6 
It Air Foret' 'IIId N((l'{(lforct's 
The andlysis ofMOE s pertaining 10 all naval and Air Forc~ a.>pec ts ~ r e presented in 
LT Michael Fulkerson's thesis tRef 2] 
Slopp;"1t Nllh',s 
(1) Final Objectives The results fo r ail Red eOAs, across all Blue entry ~ases. are 
given in Appendix CO, Figures G-I through G-1 2 Thc results for Red eOA I are given in Figures 
G4 through Go In R l -E I (Figure (;-4), replication twO, Red came cio,;e to reHching Pus~n, but 
was SlOpped at Pohang, which is the rlext city to the east of Pusan. In replication t h~ee, Red did 
Sllcceed in reaching Pusan The thick outline represcnts the area under Red's control at ENDEX 
The reader will note the dashed part of till' thick outline. whieh is the only difTerenct between 
,-eplications 1 and (2 ami 3) The results of all three replications for R I-E2 and RJ-E3 are 
displayed irl Appendix G, Figures G-5 and G-6, respectively, for colllparisoli. In the RI-E2 case, 
Ked's penetration into South Korea was not m:arly as extensive as in R I-E 1 or R I-E3 III R I-E2 
repl i>:3t ions, Red forces were stopped by Suwon and Yongdok (the reader is reminded thar the 
object;ve for Red. across all its eOAs, is to reach Pusan) Again, the thid ouliine imiicale, the 
area under the control of Red R I-E3 is vef)' similar to the first caSt, R j -El. In both cases Red 
had substantial penetration into the soutll The difference between thf<.>e two rases is that K~d did 
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not reach PUSi\n Red was stopped at Pohang. the next city tLl the casl of Pusan, These res liit s 
Me eounterint lli tive as well In the RI-EI and RI-E3 cases, Red penetrated the farthest into the 
sOllth In bOlh these cases, Blue had a much I~rger lniliHI joint force prt:stnl In the R I-E: case 
initial Blut fu rces (the forward deploy~d ground forces) wne witholl t lht: benefit of Naval Fi re 
Support (Air and "fLAM,;), Marint: amphibious assault forces and follow-on ASlllY "repo Mloa> 
forces. for at least the firSllwo days, This wuuld have given the Reu fmct:s it larger advaillagt: 
over Blue for at if-ast Ihe first two days of the conflict and allowtd th~m t{'l penetrate as far or 
farther than the other two Blue entry cases. In Red eOA 1, across all three entry cases and ~I I 
three rcplication" Red reachcd its final ohject ive, Pusan, only one time In generaL the simu lmion 
w~s not ttrminalcd a~ a rcsult of the final objectives being reachtd 
The results of Red eOA 2 are given in Appendix G. Figur~s G-7 through G-9 
The rcsu lts . across all entry cases and all replications in the Red eOA 2. were very similar, Rcd 
penctrated the lilrthest into South Korea in case RZ-E2, where il reach Pilsan in r~plication t\\'o, 
and was un the transil node leading into Pusan on the other repl icatiuns one and three. In R2-El 
and R2-E3, Red penetrated as far as Taegu, the next city to the north of Pusan In Red eOA 2 
across al l lhree entry cases and allthrte replicatiuns, Red reached its fllla l objective, Pusan , only 
In general. Ihe simulation wa~ not terminated as a result of the final ob;ectives IJCil1g 
reached 
The results of Red eOA 3 are given in Appendix G, Figll res G-IO through G·I: 
"I.nu~s all entry cases and all replications in the Red eOA 3, the results were very similar Red 
penetrated the furthest into South Kurca in case R:; ·E2> where it reach PLlh~ng nhe next cit\' to 
the east of Pusan), ehungju and Kongju in replicat ions one and two In RJ -E l and R3 -EJ, R~d 
p~ne!latEd ~s f~r as Yongdok (the [le~: city to the t"a,t ofPo!1angl. Chur;chon. ~nd Kon ~~ i ll In 
Red r O A J, aClo,s al l thret" ent ry cases and ~II rh ree repli<.:2 tion:; , Red failed 10 reach its tilla l 
The simulm ion was not terminated~, ~ resu lt of the final ob jectives be i n~ reac lled 
In general. for all Red COAs and Blue entry ca;;es, the s l mLJI~! i on was not 
terminated due ~o Red reaching its fina l objed ive 
(2) Bre~k Poinrs . The ground -to-grOl,nd combat ~ttri t i on break point nata are 
given in Appendi~ J, Table J- l. In all case,. except for the two cases noted above, (he simulation 
termi na ted bec~u:;c one 0: both sides had leachentheil break poinfs. in rnost cases one or both 
si des were well helow the e;;tablisheu bleak point of 50% hefore the simulatio n term:nated, 
indicat ing another area for fu turt" inve:;ligdtion 
ArHllysis of thc Pcrception MO E's 
All COA pelception results are given in Appendix H (Tables H- l through H-I S) The 
graphs in set 1 show that there was a genera l similarity hetween specific CQAs, ac~oss 
replicat ions, btl! that there was also variability between repiications. There were no two COA 
perceptions that were the samt" Given the model's de;;ign, the variahili tv and the similarity were 
e"pectec. 
C()A Perceptions 
(I) Gro und Tnnh Red eOA I The graphs fo r Red eOA I (Blue entl)-' cases I 
thrOLlgh J) are given in Appendix 11 Tahles B-1 t hrough H-6. Even with the v~ria bi l i~y between 
repl ications. Hille 's percep ti on of Red's ground truth COA 1, in the R I-E I through E-, entr) 
ca,es, was genet'aliy above the 50% prohab!e I ~vcl In all replica tions within this entr)' case, when 
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Blue marle the decision to commit forces, Blu t" also correctly chose Red COA I d,' lile [\\OSI 
probable eOA Red would pursue. Even though Blue perceived. and subsequently selected tile 
correct Re;:d eOA in al l replications anJ entry cases, the probabilitv level associated wi th Blue's 
percep tion of ReJ's eOA I intuitively should have been higher ami nlore slable Only in Red's 
ground truth eOA I were logistic Hnd combat units sent to Kosong Once ~ logistics unit was 
detected enroute to. or in Kosong, the probability of Red eOA I should have appr{'dched 1.0, 
since there were no other possible eOAs thaI involved Kosong. There were two replications 
where Blue's perception of Red eOA I did not linish as the dominant one, one replication in ellcit 
orthe following cases. RI-EI and RI-E2. In both RI-EI llnd RI -E2. Blue's perception of Red 
eOA I was dominant throughout most of the simulation, however at the very end (the last half of 
a day. in SIMTlME) Blue's perception of Red eOA I fell , This is a cause for funher 
investigation to insure the proper functioning of the computer code within the model. Red's initial 
perccption ofOlue's eOA. in all replications within Ihis entry case, heavily favort"d Blue's eOA_' 
By attack time (SIMT1ME = 6,0), Red's perception of Blue's eOA I had starled to increase (to 
approximately 035), but Red 's perception of Blue's eOA 3 was stil l favored , Red' .<; perception of 
Blue eOA 3 stayed Jominant across all replicdtion~ and entry cases unti l SI ~vITIM'E = 9,5. 7.0, 
and 7.75 (R I-EL R I-E2, R I-E3 , respectively) After the SIMTIMES previously ment ioned, 
Reds perception of Blue's eOA vaci!latt"d . Blue eOA I diJ finish as the dominant the majoritv of 
the times (six out of the nine possible times), Blue eOA 3 fmisiled dominant twice ~nd Blue eOA 
~ finished once as the dominant eOA This is also cause for fun her invest igation to insure the 
proper functioning of the computer code within the model, specifically near the end of the 
simula!ion 
74 
(2) Ground Truth Red eOA 2. The g,aphs for Red eOA 2. (Blue ent ry ~ases I 
:hrough 3) are given in Appe,;cii~ H, Tab les H-7 th,ough H- [1 . BI \I ~ c.o rreet l\' perceived and 
chose Rerfs grounri truth e OA in on ly QI:e ent ry case, R2·E I [11 R2 -F ] (for all replications) 
Blue made its decision on Rea eOA at SlMTI!\{E - 25. In all other cases, Blue aid not uecide 
unt ;] SI\1T1ME = 375. IfBi:Je had [[lade all deci~ions at SlMTIJ\1E =:: 5. Hlue would have 
~hosen Reri CO A 2. a~ros, the board If Blue had made al l deCIsions at STMT1M£ = 3.75 . iT 
would have chosen Red eOA I, across !he hoard In al l three entry cases. pr ior W att~ck time 
Blue's perception of Red's eOA was vel)' erratic, not favoring any specifrc Red eOA In evel)' 
case, after attack time, Blue's perception of Red ground tWlh eOA 2 became the domina:u or:e 
Red per~eplion of Hlue's eOA were simi lar in behavior to Reu Gmund Tnlth eOA I, discu>sed 
above Red's pe~ceptiDn of Blue's eOA J, p1ior to attac.k time, was consi~tell1ly the dominJnt 
eOA_ 1\ ot unti l la:e (approximate!y . SElilTliVlE -= 8.0) in the simuiatlOn did Red 's perception of 
Blue 's e OA I start to increa~e . However, Red 's perception of Blue eOA 3 remained t he 
dominant eOA, throughout the simulation Red may have incorrect ly perceived BJue' ~ eOA, 
l>ecause the distinctions between the Blue eOA's I and 3, are not a~ readily apparent The 
d:fferences are noticeable in the southern parts of the central and eastern corridOI~ 
(3) Ground Tnlth Red eOA 3 The graphs for Red eOA:; (Hlue entl)' ea~es I 
through 3) al-e given in Appendix Il Tahles 11- 13 thrO:lgh t l-18 Riue 's perceptions of Red '.., 
g,ol!lld trut h eOA 3, at decision lime, was incorrect acros~ lhe hoard . The differences between 
Red eOA I and 3 are not vely apparent after the attack commences. However. prior to the 
Jttack, theTe were differences whidl Blue should h~ve been able to detect. [11 Red eOA I, there 
were logist ;cal and combat units al Kosong; huwever, in Red eOA 3 there were not even 
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though both eOAs allaek down the eastern corridor, the presence or \~ck of presence of units in 
Koson~ should have been sufficient to di~tinguish between the two eOt\s This is a eause tor 
furt her investigatiOn to insure the proper fu nctioning urthe computer code within the monel As 
discussed in Red Ground Tru th eOA 2, Red 's perr.:eption of niue's eOA 3. prior to attack time 
was consistently the dominant eOA Red's perception of Blue eOA 3 remained tile domimmt 
eOA throughout the simulatiun 
(4) Genera! Trends for all Red eOAs Regardless of entry caSt. or replication 
nu mber. the Red eOA perceptions were almost ei(l\ctly the same until SIMTlME = 4 2~ For 
example, in R I-E I. Red's pcrr.:eptiun uf Blue's eOA J was almost the same for all replications and 
also for RJ ·[2 and R I -E3 The same was true for Red's perception of Blue's eOAs 1 and 3, as 
well as for R2-E J. R2-E2 . R2-EJ lind R3·EI. R3-E2. R3-E3, This resuh is also explainable 
During Red 's bui ld-u[l phase, SIMTI[\..1E 0.0 to 6,0. Blue's furward deployed forces did not move 
therefure nuthing changed between replication. eOA or entry case until the joint forces arrived 
The decision \0 commit the juint furee was dependent on Blue's prediction of Red'g attack time 
btlt occurred before SIMTllvlE = 4,25 , The ranges of decision times were from SIMTllvfE = 2,5 
to SIMTIME "" 3,75 By SIMTlME = 425. Red sensor's were detecting the arriving Blue units 
and changes in perception were recorded. The variability in Blue's prediction uf Red\ attack time 
will be analyzed in the next section. The above events were probably due to the lad of any 
ch~llges in the Red logistic units flow . Until SIMTllvlE = 6,0. the only sensor observ~tions being 
generat ed were from sensor observations of Red logistical units. Since the nt'lw t'lfRed logisti(al 
units did not change belween replications. it is reasot'lable that the pereeptiofl5 generated fTor1l 
these observalions would be very similar un til SIMTlll.-fE = 6 ,0 (the logist ical flow did ehHnge 
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bct'.>een Red eOAs) Rerall tha t ~ T SIIl-1Tll\l£ = (),O . Red cond\lct~d its ar;~c~ ~ rld romuM l~n l ~S 
were thendetectabTe 
In case R I (Red ground truth eOA 1). and acros5 BII tn(ry c~ses (Blue entrY' use~ 
I , 2, or J), every first rcplicatior, produced the same Bi lle perception of Red eOA J, 2, and J 
i!!'I!il approximately SI\1Tl,vfE ~ 2:) Tile reader will not ice that the !epl i c~tioTl I's of Blue' , 
perception of Red COA I, across all Blue entry cases (in groul1d truth Red COA I) were the SJme 
url( il approximately SIMTJ\·rr: = 2 5 Nier that time, only the replications fro m entlY rao;es 2 
and J remained t!le same_ The replications fronl entry e~ses 2 and ] wer~ the s~me until 
app roximJtdy SIMTIiVlE = 5,0, then all were differen t. For example, replicaTior' J. fro~n R l -E I 
was ' he same ~s rep l i c~tion J from RI -E2 and replication I from RI-E} unt il SIMTIME = 2,5, 
~nd then only the rep licat ions from R I-E2 and R l -E3 were the 5ame Note, however. that the 
rep iicatiorts were dif1'~rent wit hi n ~n emf)' c~se , This w~s also True for R2-EI. Rl-E2, R2 ·E3, but 
no! for R3 -E I , R3 -E2. R3-EJ , This resu lt is unexplainable at this time and is a c~use fo r further 
investi gation to insure the proper fimctioning oflhe computer eode and the pelception algorithm 
1Y1thin the model 
h. A/(lIck Time Pac{'priam 
The resuhs of all the allack time perceptions were generally the same for J II 
combinations of Red eO,A. and Blue entry case. These result s are given in Append ix I. Tables I-I 
through 1-9. Wilhin a Red eOA and Blue enTry case, (lie le \-\las some sma ll variabi li!y between 
replications, but the v~r i ~bilily w~" so minute the differences wt're grarl, i c~ l l v ulldetec:ahle (the 
difrerences normally occurred in the third or fourtn deci:llal place) The only noticeable difference 
was in replication I ofR i -El and RJ -E3 These two cases were diifCrel1l from the other c~ses, 
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but were almost identical to each other. Tllese similarities are explainable PriQr to ~ttad; timt 
eOA perception updates were only affected by logistic unit delec: ion, and sllb~eCJ\lent sensor 
obser'vations . No other detections and sensor observations conlributed 10 tile eOA j1erception 
updates unti l after that lime, Since the logistics flow rate was constant throughout the logist:cal 
build-up period (SIMTIME 0,0 " 6 0) and there was sufficient time for several sensor update 
cvcle~. the effect of the variability in the I3 lue sensors on the overall eOA was mini"lal 
figure J3 shows I3lue 's perception of Red 's attack time for R3-E3 Simulation time 
in days i, plotted on the X-axis and Blue's perception of Red's attack time is plotted on lhe 
Y-axi s. The actual aTtack time (ground truth for Red) is plOlted at SIMTllvfE = 6.0 days Recall 
that attack time is determined when Red has sufficient iogisticaiunib to support an olfensive 
atTack The horizontal line, labeled actual attack lime, indicates t his event. Blue's perceived 
attad.: time (as discussed previously in the logist ics rate algorithm) is a time prediCiion of when 
Blue lhinks Red will have sufficient logist ics stockpiles forv.mrd to suppor1 ~n offensive attack 
The other three curves reflect the change in Blue's perception of Red's attack time for lhe three 
replications There was some variability between replications. most notably between replications 
(I and 2) and 3 There was no difference between replications I and 2 
I Blue's perception of Red's Attack Time 
v Cf=Red,o:t'jol!\lI..ul ,..,~ 
'..:;tj'. GJ. j ; ~¥ 6 , , 
l , 
~ ~ 
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Figure 13, Attack Time 
Hlue's perception of the attack time asymptot ically approached Red's true attllck 
time, SIJ\.-lTIME = 6,0, This perception and all the following perceptions were carried out only 
until Blue WllS forced 10 make a decision 10 commit forces In general. niue's decision w~s made 
between SIMTIJ\.1E " 3,75 and 4 ,25, The model slOpped the COA perceptions ca lculation ha~t"d 
on jogi,tical unit detections and subsequent sensor obscrv~ti:ms wilen tile Doat time went to zero 
This was due to the computation burden i( placed on the current computer platform, Once the 
computational iiIllitalion is reduced , eOA perceptions c~n be c~lcula(ed by sensor observations 
from both logistical units and combat units , As nlentioned. cases KI-E2 thwugh E3 , R:2-Fl 
through E3. lind R3- E I through E2 arc almost identical to replications I a!ld :2 in R3-E3 
In Figure )4, Blue 's perceived tl oal time is displ ~ y t"d Simulation t'.me;:1 days is 
plotted on the X-axis and Biue's perception of Red'.; attack tim~ is ploned an the Y-axis, The 
actual attack time (ground truth for Red) is plotted at SIMlTME = 6,0 days Recall tilat atlack 
time is de,erTl1ined when Red has sufficient logist ical uni ts to suppor1 an ofrell"ive aHac!.; Tile 
horizontal line, iabeled actual attack time, indicates this event. Blue's perceived at:aCh time (as 
discussed previously in the logistics rale algorithm) is a time prediction of when Blue thinh3 Red 
will have sufficient logistics stockpiles forward to suppon an offensive allad The other three 
curves reflect the change in Blue's perception uf Red's attack time for tile three repl icat ions 
Again. there is very little variability between repl ications and cases 
2 ~ liL-
o =~~ 
~ 0 .• • ' .' 2 2.' , , ., •• , , H " 
Figure 14. Flollt Time-
In replication> I and 2, Blue's float time went to zero at SlMll!lIiE '" 3.75, whereas 
in replication 3 the float timc went to zero at SlMTlME "" 4.0. The decision to m mmit forces 
was made later in this replication. As mentioned earlier, cases RI·E2 through E3. IU·El through 
E3. and R3- E I through E2 are almost identical to replications I and 2 in R3-E3 
Figure 15 depicts the constant logistical huild-up and Blue's perception of Red 's 
logis tical build-up. The reader will note that for all replications. the perceived logistical build-up 
is below Red's actual value If the perceived build-up lines were extrapolated llntil they 
intersected the 60 logistical units leveL the SIMTIME would be slightly larger than SIMTIME = 
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60 As a res li lt , the arrival of Blue', rt"inforcing forces were slight ly late . C".ses R 1- £2 thrOllgh 
E3. R2-EI thro llgh E3 , and R3 - E I through E2 are aimos: idenTic~1 TO r~p l ic~t io n'i I and 2 in 
R.l -E3 
Fi::;lIfe 15. Logistical Fluw 
In Figure 16 the Bille'.; pe~ceived total logistical rate (per day) is shown Red's 
actua i rale is 12.5 l ogi~tical uni t;; per day per node. The reader wil l note that Blues pe,·ception of 
Red 's logistical rale initially increased dramatical ly and then fl attened out frOnT SIMTL\.1E = 1.0 
to 20 Since Blu~ did not have cont inuous sensor observations of Red. the initial dramatic ~ise in 
the perceived rate was a ~efieetion of the bui ld-up that occurred between sensor updat~ cycles 
Reca ll that initia ll y, the sensor update cycle is once every twenty four hours and if; not inc~eased 
until Blue has perceived an increase in the rate outside of the established status quo. Once the 
in Cl"e as~ is determined to be outs ide the status quo, the sensor update cycle is increased to once 
every two hours. The flat area i~ indicat ive of no sensor observaTions during that per iod After 
the sensor update cyde was increased (SlMTJ'\1E = 2 0). the incle~se in Blue ', perceived 
lo,g ist ical rate asymptotic~lly approaches the actual rate As previously mentioned, cases R I-E2 
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:hrough EJ , Rl-, . EI thrO: lgh EJ, and R, 
_ In RJ-EJ . - E I through E2 
are almost identical t o repiic,ations I and 
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v. CO'lCLUSIO~S A~D RECOMME'IDA nONS 
Even though the analyses of the situation indicate current motiel ,honcom:ngs the\' 
demonstrate that EETLi\l is capable of providing meaningful results anti analvsis of Joint 
operations conducted in an uncenain world. Not only are the join: opermional deci~ions macie in 
a stochastic environment. as opposed to a deterministic one, but they are 1!lade under uncenaint'r 
with the best incomp lete information available. and not marle based on ground trurh Til is 
approach aaows fOf more realiSTic investigations of operations in the new wo rld order. Again, The 
reader is reminded thaT The model is still i:1 a prototype developmem stage. and this thesi~ has 
identified currem areas of deficiency. However, ollce those identified problems are corrected ilnu 
a more SLJitable computational platfofm is adopted. conclusions drawn from s i mil~t 
be 111'~C~ more henefieial 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
T~e original problem STatement was decomposed into three separate issues for investigaTion 
III Chapter III Those isslles were investigated in ChapTer IV and the conclusions fo r those issues 
are listed beiow From these conclusions the answer to the thesis ' oroblern statement wi!! be 
drawn 
1. Impact orCOA Pneeptiolls on Joint Operations 
(I Perccption CIWNKC,\ OPe/' time 
From (lie IesuJts given in Appendix! I, The reader C~11 conclude tha11herc w?> a 
very limi:eu impact of joint ope~at i ons on Red's perception of Blue's actuai COA ThlS was a 
H."SUIt of the lack of more Than one Naval eOA The Navy generi~al!y supported all the Theater 
8) 
eOA, in th~ same manner, no matter which grou nd eOA Blue WJS JctuJllv pursuing Therefore 
the impact the Joint operations made on Red's eOA perceptions was nOl significanr betwee:l 
eOAs and entry cases. Future applications shoulJ incorporated differenr Navv (,OAs. to include 
feigned amphibious assaults or troop landings, ';0 that the impact on Red s perceptiO!l of the actual 
COA Blue chosen is realized 
h. Pl'rcl'ptifm,\ ojeOA,\ 
As discussed above. the joint forces provitleJ li tt le impact un Red 's perception of 
Blue's eOAs. Analysis of the eOA graphs revealed that Red. on every occasion. initially 
perceived Blue's eOA to be eOA 3 This perception was dominant until after attack time 
Therefore. if ReJ had the opportunity to actually choose the COA it wanted to pu rsue. ReJ would 
have chosen to pursue the ir eOA which was most advantageous (recall that the user currenrly 
predetermines the CO,\ which Red will pursue) Dynamic selt:ction of CO As by both sides during 
model execution is a subject for fu ture n:search. Blue's perception of ReJ's eOA were fairly 
consistent and accurate for Red CGAs ] anJ 2. hut inconsiSTent fo r Red eOA 3 
2. lm]Jllctoftime 
a. Jt'l,cn must rhe ricci,\ion to commit joillf jflrce.~ he m(lite? 
The impact of when 10 GOmmit joint forces was demonsr.rated in the analysis of the 
force strengths. There wcre significant differences in >uength levels (ground-to-ground, logistics 
and personnel ) between entry cases. Recall the entry cases case I: ea rly arriva l of joint fOrCe5 
case 2: late arriva l of joint forces: a! ld case 3, on lime arrival ofioint forces The late arr ivdl of 
Join! forces was imrodLlced so that the effect of not having joint forces when hOSTili ties 
commenccd. for whatever reason. could be assessed '\ $ discussed in Chapter IV. the analyses of 
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lhe rvl0Es indi cates model enhancetnems Me reljui red tCl produce more tneaningihl results Once 
(he model haS1llatured . th is type of analyses should be revis ited 
h. Prepositian aflan/ 
Prepo Afloat was nlodeled in EETLM The reinforcing Army unirs, as part [lfthe 
JOint force. were carried on marilime preposi tion ships (MPS) The Prepo units arrived wi th the 
loint force. and went inlO Celmba! The off· loading_ marshaling, and tact ical assembly were not 
Inodded in any detai l in (bis thes is. bUI couid easily be incorpOlated in fu ture ver,sion, or' EETLM 
Additionally, the entire Plepo Afloat process could be modeled stochastically, to reflect sea and 
weather condit ions, pon t:1c:iities, and un it preparaTion ?nd training 
3. llsefulness of EETLM \0 the JTF Co mmander 
1I. 111 the p/mrning p/IIl ,~e of/he operation 
,As mentioned above, in every case Red perceived that Blue was pursuing e OA 3 
until after anack rime ff Red had t h~ option to dynamic?lIy changes its e OA, Red would have 
most probably chosen 10 pursue a eOA which exploited Blue's eOA 3. A~med with this 
knowledge. ? commander and hi;; staff could then better plan the ir eOA The eOA chosen by the 
I3l ue commander couid also bc tcstcd against the other pClssible Red eOAs, 10 see how potenti~lIy 
robust the B lue eOA might bc This information is obviously only as gDod ?s currenl intell igence 
~nd the model 's ability to accurately represent perception ch?nges The possible iI1lP~C 1 S ~ n(i 
Oll tcomes of "What ir' qllestions can also be "imulated 10 develop ?ltern~te pians. n ll , would 
tl!ci: itaTe the planning for many operM i on~ ' contingencies withi n a mission or campaign 
85 
h. Enrollie III Ille rlle(lle,. of operalion 
Intelligence officers often "fi ll in lhe blanks" ahout the enemy wit Ii assumptions or 
best guesses. based on their insight. training or intu ition Since int~l l igcnc~ gathering is a 
continua l process. new information confirms, or denies assumptions. ami provides furthe r il1~ iglit, 
As this new intelligence is made available to the commander, he can test the robuslrless of his 
selected CO}\ to obtain an idea of the potential outCGmc. EETLM could be extremely usefu l to R 
wmmanaer elitoute to a theater of ore ration for two rcasons First. once an early entry unit 
deploys. the rraveltime can he used to analyze outcomcs. and second. intelligence It .,ually 
becomes more available the doser the time is to mission execution 
S lre l1/:l11 {el'el" 
From a planning perspective. a JTf commander would have an idea of what IOSSb 
he might incur', what losses he should be prepared to incur. and what the consequences of those 
losses might be. Similarly, the commallder will have an idea of the enemy strength levels at 
certain in terva ls in the contlict 
EETLM has the potential to model joint operations and can offer the JTF 
commander' valuablt' insights as to the potential outcomes EETLM can be used as a valuable 
planning and/or training tool , once a more mature vers ion of the mGdel is produccd 
B. R ECOJ\lJ\.l EN IJATIONS 
Therc are four m~in areas of recommendations the dynamic nature of the joint model: the 
validatiun process. the war figh ting capabilities: and the model as a t!"aining tOGi 
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I. n,e Dynamic Natll,'e of (he Join ! Model 
EETUvl needs to become more dynamic. in that all services should ac t ~n support or a 
specdic thea ter level COA Currently, the ground force , do. the Naval for~e> do (but 10 ~ much 
lesser extem) and the Air Forces do nUl T he Naval forces do sUt)pon the theater ("0.'\: however 
their actions ale. for the mos t p~l1, scripted anri thl lS. suppon eve!)' theate! COA in the ,n ine way 
Thi s does no! pTOvide much oppol1l!1lity for tile morie! 10 act on its perceptions of enemy rOA 
locatiolls, 0; activities Thereby. model dynamics for Naval operations are severely li m i t~d. Thus. 
all scr ipted mis>ions and operations 5hould be removed ~nri dynamic logic anri rule set, rieveloped 
and implemented The A..ir Force ~lodule riynami~al l y supports the overal l then ter objective 
however. it does not speciiically supp0r! the theater COA \<lissiolls. targets. and aircraft 
combinations me identified and dynamically selected 10 conduct deep striKe , bJtt lefield 
irnerdiction. close air Sllp:!Ort, and Jir interdict ion The miS5ions. targets. and ai rn~ft 
combinnt ions are not current ly affected by the e OA the theater is pursuing. Miss ion and target 
priorities wi!! char.ge bctween eOAs, and th is will affect the aircraft combinatior.5 selected to 
conduct the missior.s. The.ie changes in mission and target priorities should be reflected in the Ai! 
Foret'·s' >upport of a specific theater COA It is recommended that. inste>td of implernent:ng the 
Air module at the theater icvd, so it genericallv supports the overall theate r ob jectives, the Air 
moduie should be irnpic:llemed individually for each theater eOA. This wil l allo>v the Air module 
to riynamically tmget pr io ri ti ze, mission plan. and select optimal combinat ions of aircraft in 
detai led >upport of the priorities of a speci fic theater ("OA rbis w111 eilin ill.ne the generic 
SLlpport to lhe theater 
2. The Verificntioll Process 
As mentioned in the thesis limitat ions. FTLM and EETLM are still in the ir infancy. as ta r 
a ~ model development To date. the emphasis of the model development has heen to demonstr ,ne 
the new stochastic modeling concepts. Rapid progress has been made in th is elToll The major 
conceptual algorithms have been well thoughl out and arc mathematically correct. however. they 
have nOl been verified to insure that they arc operating correct ly within the comiJUter simu lation 
There are other algorithms currently operating within EETLM thai are merely "place holder" 
algor ithms. Im! i! more robust and detailed algorithms can be implemented The attrition algorithm 
is an e"ample of one such "place holder" algorithm. Currently. EETLM uses a simplistic allrition 
algorithm. which wil l be replaced by the ATCAL - COSAGE attrition process in the near future 
The ATeAL - COS AGE attrition proccs, is il wel l known and accepted att ri tion algorithm within 
the cOlllbat simulation community. [Ref 19. PG 134-142] Other algorithms in this category are 
the sensor detection, deep indirect fires, attack time. and sensor alloca tion. It is recommended 
that enhanceu decision rule sets and algori thms be implemented. Once this is accomplished. an 
e"tensive verification and valid at ion process should be conducted to insure corTeetness of all 
algorit flms 
3. rhe War Fighting C:tp:thilities 
EETLM was conceived and developed with the idea of simulat ing joint theater level 
combat Current ly. only a limited number of cr it ical war fighting capabi lities are included. Other 
critical war fighting capabilities whi~h should be modeled arc mine warfare. anti _ submarine 
warfare. Theater Ballistic Missile Defe nse (TBr>.lD). Army avimion. Rnd weapons ofmas~ 
destruct ion Mine warfare is becoming more ~nd more critical to the Navy. uue to lIS change in 
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mi,sion from bll't.' wale~ to litloral o?eralions The Navy paid a heavy pr:ce in Ihe i'eJsian Gulf 
wilh ml~e strikes by the Samuel Rohcrt~, PrinceTOn, and the Tarawa. Even though the Soviel 
~avv threat has been leduced, t~.ere are many countries :hal have submarines Iran and !\ nrt il 
Korea me two such COll1ltl!eS. both of which are potential contingency area, TBMD Tllil)' be a 
spin-OIT from the Gulf WM SCUD-busting efforts: however, a reallhrea( exists ano ils illlpaci 
shou ld be considered w!1!'n modeling theater level comhat. Weapons ofTllass des~ruc:ion 
(chemica!, biologicaL and nuclear) fa ll into lhis same realm and should al50 be co~,idered in 
:'ETLM Again, this is not because the threal ora massive Soviet nude~r launch exists. bUI 
hecause co c; nnit's like Iraq and 'Ionh Korea possess we~pons of mass destmction. ArmyaviatiO;l 
needs to be reoresen ted because it is another as,el which Ihe theatcr level commander ha!' at his 
disposal (for both close combat alld deep st:ike operations) . Thlls, it is recommended that the 
crilical war fighling capabilit ie5 outlined above be :ncorporated in future versions ofEETL\1 
4. The Modd as a Training Tool 
t::ETLM is currently an anal~1ical tool. however, there is imerp.st ~rom t he Army and th", 
N~\'y to also use EETLM as a training 1001 Sleps should be taken to provide an imeraclive 
wargame version ofEETLM. This wouid increasc the v;;llle Oflh~ model for c. JTF commander, 
be~ausc it would give him more flexi bility enrollle for "what if' analysis and ","Quid .1 lso improve 
his mission planning for potential operalions and st~fftraining i,t a macro leve l. the model could 
also he used at the Joint Chief of Staff'> level and at the Senior Service Colleges for ilivestigJlions 
into contingency operations. or pOlem;al confliCIS 
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VI. flJT URE RESEARCH 
,\ . l\Wl TItLE UNITS ON A NODE 
EETLM <.;annOl accoun! fo r mo re than one uni r occupying a node (physical or tlansil) al any 
one time The model is nOI equipped 10 distinguish belween two or mOle units, or onc la r-ge r- unil 
(t h ~ comhination orlhe IWO or more uni ts) 
In Ref 14, pg 27-28, Karl S<.;hmidl describes a fu1Llre improvement ,0 FTLM concerni ng 
partitioning of nodc<; Considering LTC Mark Youngr~n's paper [Ref 20j, lhe concept of 
phys;<.;a l node partitioning is to allow a parent unit to orient its sub -units (chi l dr~n) ~ long certain 
transi t nodes coming imo the physical node This is accomplished by allocating the sub-units to 
,~ ec~fi~ areHS with in the physical node directly in front or lhe transit node~ for which the sub-unrls 
are responsibk, as shown in fi gure 17 
Figure 17, :"Inde Panitioning 
If this luea is extended to major unit s inst ead of suu-units, more than one mapr unit call exisT 
on a physi<.;a l node. The physical node would have to be either dynamically panitil'ned imo the 
requiSite number of section:;, depending on tbe actual number of major units curren!ly occupying 
'il 
rhe physica l norle. or it would have to b~ initialized with a fixed number of seer ions Fi"lng l h ~ 
number of sections would limit the number of major units able to occupy that physical norle at ~Il) 
one ~ime By doing this, EETLM cou ld then calculate the probabilities associated with each unit 
wi thin a section of the nod~ and those probabilities would feed the eOA perceptions. TranSit 
nodes could be handled in a similar manner and would allow for more than one unit to be on ~ 
,ystem tr~nsit node, al anyone time 
An alternal ive method for partitioning of nodes (both physical and transit) is to use sever~1 
sma ller nodes to represent the original , larger physical node, and connect each smai ler node 
together with short transit nodes In Figure 18 is an example of a smaller sub-nod~s system 





Avenues of Approach 
In and Out of Physical ____ 
Node 
Figur(' 18. Suh-Node Partitioning 
This would work for both physical and transit nodes_ Effedivciy, this lVould allow fo r mUTe 
than one unit to be on a node at anyone time; however. it would increase the computation 
compl exity of the model EETLM would also he requireci to have the capability to dynamically 
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divide LOnits into sub-units . 2.nd ~pportion them on nodes in support of ,he desired f:iendil 
COA and the perceived enemy avenue of approach EETLM would ~ I so h~ve !O reunite the 
sub-unilS for movement, or when neceSSRTy fIIis d~velopme[lt can be explored once a mwe 
computatio n~lly capable piRIform is realized 
n. MIJ\" IJ\.1U1\1 NU MBER OF FORWA RD DEPLOYED TROO P UN ITS 
The initial focus of th is thesis \vas to address thj<; primary issue Recal lSI' Join! theater level 
oper~tions had not been previously mCldeicd in a stochastic environmem, EETLM was developed 
New algorithms Ivere introduced to allow for Ihis maturation . As a resull, the focu s of this thesis 
is the d ocurnent~lion and the demoll$t ration oflhese new capabilities The problem sta tement \V~s 
changed to demonstr~te EETLM's capability to model and conduct joint thealer ievel operations 
The malurity level of the n:odel did no t permit (he minimum force isslAe to be investigated 
However. after vaiirlation. the Ilumber of comb~t ,milS rellllired to be forward deployed in a 
theMel cou ld he inveSligated The approach to this ~nal ysis is outlined below 
If a specific nurllber of rorward deployed units can hold their positions. or de lay long enough 
for reinforcements!O arrive, then the question ofwheth~r or not the number of for\\'Mrl deployed 
units could be decreased and stil l hold theil po.iitions can be investigated . Iflhe 
reinforcement /de lay lime is fixed. and th~ numb~r of forward d~ployed units is incrementally 
decreased (incrementally increasing the rei nforcing force) . then the point a( which the forwarrl 
deployed fo rces will no longer be able!O accmn pl is ll their delay miss ion c~n be detenl1'ned . At 
II MI lime. lhe forwa rd deployed forTe would be below its minimum force size for Rccor np lishing 
Its missIOn The forward deploved force size would have to be increased by one unit. After the 
increase. the forward deployed force would he at its minimum size. The actual magnillAde of 
93 
increase would depend on many fac!Qrs and would have to be investig~ted . The sil~ incrcaoc i, 
stochastic in nature and would certainly require a large number of replications 10 determine an 
opti mal size of increase Once th is has been determined, the impact ofreiniorcement times and 
composit ion of the joint force could be investigated. For example, O~lCe th .... minimum forward 
deployed force size is determined, the impact of having one Aircraft Carrier Task For ce with a 
Marine Assault Ready Group (ARG) in the immediate area, versus having tW(l of these IVpe t~ok 
forces, or only having the 82nd AnN OIV on standbv. or any eombin~tion , e~n be investigated 
This may le~d to a filrther reduction of the number of forward deployed forces. This ~n~ I )'sis 
would focus on potel\lial rt:sourct: allocation tradeoffs and their impacts on rhe outcomes of 
thearer operations 
C. COURSES Of ACTION 
EETLM operares under Ihe closed world assumption with regard to eo As EETL/I.·l does 
not consider any eOA nor present in its database There is no requirement to have the ground 
tnlth eOA present in EETLM. howt:ver, all probability is distributed across the eOAs that are 
represented. So. iflhe actual eOA is not present . the eOA, that are inlhe database will 
accumulate more probabiliry rhan they ,hould In a planning situation. if strict operational 
security was enforced. and two planning stalTs developed their own opera tion plan" to include 
friendly (Bl ue) and enemy (Red) COAs, based on current intel ligence levels. it is conceivable that 
one or both sides would not hav~ included the actual ground troth eOA of the ('iher in it> 
selections of enemy rOAs So as the simulation unfolded. the model would distribute rhe 
probability over the available eOAs Obviously. the actual enemy grou nd troth eOA would not 
Teeeive any probability. because it would not exist. as f:1r as that particular side is concerned The 
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eOA which mat ched the actual glOllfld truth COA the closest would receive most of:he 
probability, and the other eOAs would receive the rest The closer a eOA [esemb leJ lht" acmal 
grou nd truth e~A, based on sensor accuracy and infon rwtion available, the mort" probabiiity .1 
would receive The benefit ofthi __ resu lt might be increased if, in that s~me situat ion descri b~d 
above, a COA category labeled "others" or "not co nsidered" was au tomat ical!y added to both 
sitieslO captme the probability of the actual ground truth COA, if not considered DoillS so 
wouid eliminate eilher sidt" from knowing the actual ground tl'Jth eOA of the other. without 
having Jeveloped il through t heir own intell igence and mission anaiysis process This woul d 
al low for morc realislic planning. The computer would obviously still know all enemy eOAs on 
bOlh sides, and woulJ continue to assess probability baseJ on the sellsor observallDns If the 
actual enemy eOA was not pa!1 of one side's pOlel1~ia l enemy eOA list, the "other eOr\s" woulti 
re(;eive the p:'obability, instend of it being distributed among the other CO As according to 
similarity This would facilitnte EETLM 's use as a traini ng 1001 for commanders and their staffs 
wllCn conduct ing war gami!]!; or mission analysis An excluded eOA or one bearing little or no 
rese tnhlance to an actua l eOA, mighl be indicat ive offaultv assumplions, logi~, miss:on planni l,g 
or ir.teiligence 
Anot her issue is the setTing of the iniTia l COA perceptions Currently. The model does Ih is 
autornatically for the user AJI eOAs perceptiOl,S are assumed to be equally likelv lInti l the first 
eOA update The user should Imve !he fl ex ibility tll in it ially input the eOA perception 
rro i:labili ties in the rlMab~se 
i\ third issue which should he included in the mature EETLM :~ dynamic COA selection by 
bOlh attacker and defender One o~ t he model iimitat ions diSClIssed in Chapter I is that once a 
9\ 
CO,\ is selected by the defende r, it remains fixed and cannot be dyn~micallv shifted to another 
eO,\ during model execution, even if the perception of thai eOA is exne1l1ely low The 
attacker's eOA selection is also tixed , Another factor is th~t. within a rOA. there are no lllet ll0d, 
tn shift from a defens ive to an offensive posture, or vice vers;l Thcre are some .';pecific missions 
which do. :n fact , dictatc purely defensive operalion~. Ho\\'cver, in a theater level operation. the 
missions ll1~y include both defensive and offensive operations 
FETL/<.f can model Joint operations and can be valuable in planning and wargaming 
opemtions. With thc above mentioncd reCOl11mcndat ions for improvement and fUlllre work 
EETLM can and will be instrtlmemal in joint operations, now and inlhe fUlure 
Af'PENl)l'\ A. GnOl:NI) COURSES OF ACTror>,' 
Genera l Red has thret viable courst, 0: a,,~io~ (CO As) Ali COAs i~volve a 10gistic!. 1 
bui ld-up of sUjJplics wel l fo~,,'al-d 10 SlljJpOrt a massive offcnsive into South Korta The 
intermediate ohjectives al-e Scoul. S\lwon. an<1 the surrounding roa<1 netv>'Ork with the flnGI 
object ives being K:..tnsan, Taegu_ Pusan, Kwanilllk and Pohang Each R~d COA has a si n~ le 
cO~lesponding BluE COA 10 countel it 
eOA I 
I. REDCOA 1 
This eOA involves a 15 Division aune!; along the Wes~enl and Easteln corridors At 
the commencement of hostilities, HaclU , Pyongyang. l"Yonggang. Woman, and Ko,ong wi ll all 
have three division, (each with 4 Brigades) atlacking from theil respective lo~ation ~ 
I-Jacjll Division 1 4 Brigade, 4 Log Units 
Division 2 4 Brigades 




\VonsaTi Division 7 
Division 8 
Division 9 
P'Y()nggang Division 10 
Division 11 
Division 12 
Kosong Divi sion 13 
Division 14 
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Division 15 4 nrigade~ 4 Log Units 
Prior to these combat units arriving and hostilities commencing, the Log Units will 
For ground truth. the Logistical Units an' scheduled into their respective nodes at a rate 
which will insure ali re'lui red logistical support i ~ in position by S!J\fTlME "-, 6 .00 SIMT IME is 
the ,:mulation time and is kept by the internal clock of the computer. It is started at the beginning 
of the simulation . Current ly. one ullit orlime is defined as one day, After the Log Units are in 
position (SI:'I.1Tli'vlE "'600). the combat units will arrive at their respective nodes and commence 
hostilities The Red auack will commence at SIMTlME = (i ,00 
P hase I . Divisions 1,4,7, I 0, I J from their respective nodes will attack to sei7e the 
following objective Seoul, Kimhwa, Chunchon, Munsan (Chor-von). Kangnung (Kansong) 
Phasc 2_ Divisions 2,5,8, 11,14 from thei r rcspective nodes attack to seize the 
following objectives- Kongju. Wonju, Taejon, Suwon, Samchok 
Phase J Divisions 3,6,9,12,15 from thdr respective nodes attack to seize the 
following obJ!'etives: KUnsan, Kwangiu, Pu,an, TaeBu, Pohang 
2. BLl'E eOA I 
Blue conducts purely defensive operations Prior to hostilities Blue forces are 
positioned in the followi ng locations 
Group_l-l Armor 4 Brigades Munsan In countl)' 
Group . 1-2 l'v1.cchanized 4 Brigades WOI1IU In country 
Grollpl-3 Infantry 4 Brigades In country 
Group.2- 1 Armor 4 Brigades In country 
Group.2-2 Armor 4 Brigades Pusan In country 
Group 2·3 Infantl)' 4 Brigades Chunchon 
Group 3-1 Mechanized 4 Brig~des Suwon 
Group_3 -2 Mechanized 4 Brigades Kimhwa In countrv 
Group .3-J Infantrv 4 Brigades Kansong In cO Lln tl)' 









G roupA-S Marine 
n. COA 2 




Anive, M 01- priol to invasion 
Arrive, al or priOI-to irl\asi(ll] 
Arrives at or prior to invasion 
Arrives at or prioT to invas ion 
Arrives at a T prior 1O inva,ion 
Arrives Rt 0 1 prior to inv~sicn 
Arrive, at ar ptiwto inva, 'on 
Arrives at or pr:or to iTlv;!sioll 
Th i ~ eOA involves a 11 Division alldck dlong the We,tcrn and C~ntra l 
the commcnC~rllem of hOitilit ies. Ibeju. Pyongyang. P 'Yonggang, WonsJn. and Ko.w rl g 'wi!! hJve 
the following Division>_ (each wilh 4 Brigades) attack ing from their respective locations 
ilaeju Division I, 
Division 10 
Pyongyang Division 4 
D:vision 5 
Division 12 
Divisi on 13 
Division 14 4 Log Unit, 




P 'Yonggang Division 3 
Division 6 
Ko&ong NONE 
Prior to tht:se comuat rmi ts arriving and hostilities commencing. tIle Log Units will 
The Log Units al-e scheduled into their rcspectiv~ nudcs at a rate w hi ch will insme ~ 1I 
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required logis tical support is in position by SIMTlME = 6.00. After the Log Units are in position 
(SIMTl/l..1E =600) the comnat units will arrive at their respective nodes and ~ommence 
hostilities 
Phase 1. Divisions 
obiective. Seoul, 
, from their rcspective norles will attack to ~cize the fol iowing 
Kunsan, Wanju, Suwon. Divisions 4,5,12,14 are in reserve at 
Pusan, Pohang 
2. Bun: COA 2 
Rlue conrluets purely delCnsive operations Prior to hostili ties Blue forces are 
positioned in Ihe following locations ' 
Group.l-l Armor 4 Brigades Munsan In country 
GroupJ -2 Mechanized 4 Brigades Wonju In country 
Infantry 4 Brigades Kangnung 
Armor 4 Brigades Seoul 
Armol 4 Brigarles Pusan In country 
4 Brigades Chunchon In country 
4 Brigades Suwon In countr.' 
Mechanized 4 Brigades Kimhwa In countl)' 
infalllry 4 Brigades Chungju In country 
Infantry 4 Brigades Chorwon In countl)' 
Armor 3 Brigades Kunsan Arrives at or prior to invasion 
Armor 3 Brigades Kongju Arrives al or prior 10 invas ion 
Airborne 4 Brig~des Arrives at or prior 10 invasion 
Air Assault 3 Brigades Arrives at or prior to invasion 
,\rmor 3 Brigarles Arrives at or prior to invasion 
Armor 3 Brigades Pohang Aniv~s at or prior to invasion 
Marine 4 Brigades Taegu Arrives at or prior to invasion 
Marine 4 Brigades Taejon Arrives at or prior to invasie>n 
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C. C OA 3 
L REOCOA3 
Th is CUA involves a 15 Division dt\ack ~ I ong 3 corridors d \Ves!er:l_ Centra l. ~nd 
taster:l At the co mmC:lcement of hostilities, IIaeju, Pyongyang, P'Yonggang. Wonsan. ~nd 
Kosong wi!! have the following Divisions (each with 4l:lrigade.';) altack:ng from their l ocation~ 
l-Iaej Ll 4 Log Units 
Pyongyang Division I 
Division 2 












Prior 10 these combat unit,; arriving and hostilities commencing, the Log Units will 
The Log Units are scheduled into then respe(;live nodes at a rate which wi ll insure all 
required logistical support is in position by SIrl.fT!rI.{[ = (',00 Aller the Log Units are in position 





2. BLUE COA 3 
B!ue conducts purely defensive operations_ Prior 10 host ilities Rlue force> art"" 










In count ry 
Pusan In count ry 
Chunchon \11 country 
Suwon In country 
Kimhwa In country 
Kansong In country 
Chorwon In country 
Kunsan Arrives al or prior 10 invasion 
Kon!:'Ju .Arrives at or prior to invasion 
Kwangj u Arrives at or prior to invasion 
Yongdok Arrivt""s at or prior to invasion 
Taejon Arrives al o r prior to invasion 
Pohang Arrives at or prior to invasion 
Samchok Arrives at or prior 10 invasion 
Chungju Arrives at or prior to invasion 
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AI' I'EN DIX C. EXA MP LE 
Area of interest contains threc nodes nodcs 1.1 . and 3 Status quo IS defined as the 
following 
Node 1 ! Armor Brigade present (1.0,0). I Logistics Unit present 
Node 2 I ,\tlechanizcd Brigade present (0.1,0), I Logist ics Uni t present 
Node 3 I Infant !), Brigade present (0.0.). I Logistics Unit present 
eOA I Composition 
COA 2: Composition 
eOA 3 CompOsition 
(2.1.1)lOtal=4 Bde. Attack (nodes 1-5-8) 
(0,0.2)tolal "'2 Bde. Defend (at node 2) 
(2 .0.2)lotal a 4 Bde. Attack (nodes 3-7-8) 
(I.O.l)total = 2 Bde. Defend (a t node I) 
( 1.2 ,1) total =4 Bde. Attack (nodes 2-6-8) 
(0.3.1) total = 4 Bde: Auack(nodesJ_7_8) 
(I,2.1)lot31 =4 Ode. Attack (nodes 1-5-8) 
(1,2.1) tOlal =4 Bde. Attack (nodes 2-6-8) 
(0.1.IJlOtal - 2 Bde. Defend (alnode 3) 
-Sensors repon an increase of Logistics Units A deviation of one additional Logist ics Unit on 
any node triggers a reset orall (OAs 
-All COAsare resct to equally likely 
-Sensor sweeps are increased 
-Over a delta time period of one week. total log unit increase in th e area of interest (nodes I. 2 
and 3) was 5 log units Therefore the overall log rate of increase ror the area orimerest is Slog 
109 
units perwet:k 
.The minimum total number of Ode size units required for any e OA is 10 Ude Therefore the 
Time of ,\Itack is 10 Bdc 1 5 Bde per week = 2 weeks This is Blue's perception of when 
Red will anack 
-The Logistics Unit increase at each node was sensed as the following 
~ode I 2 Logistics L'nit increase 
Node 2 2 Logistics Unit increase 
Node 3 1 Logistics Unit increa,e 
-Predicted Bde units at Time of Attack: Time of Attack x Individual Log rate " Number of units 
Node I 2 x 2 = 4 Ode at node I at Time of Attack 
?\Jode 2 2 x 2 = 4 Rde at node 2 at Time of Attack 
Node 3 2 x J = 2 Ode at node 3 at Time of Attack 
·These numbers of Bdes would then be used to drive the eOA probabilities In thi s example, 
eOA -' would match up and would receive the highest probability 
-If the Required Response Time 10 provide sufficient forces in theater is 1 week. Ihen the decision 
10 commit forces must/will be made in J week 
-The Early Entry Force will execute the ir eGA which corresponds 10 the Red eOA that has the 
highest probability associated with it (the greater orthe probabilities detennined by the Logistics 
units and the combat units) 
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APPE NDIX L SENSOR ALLOCATIO "',' FLOWCHART 
113 
114 
APPENf)IX F. DATASOlJRCISMAHtiX 
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APPENDIX C , DATA 
Each Red e OA is displayed in a separate table, in Tables G-I through G-3, Each table i, 
fun her subdividcd into two pans Thc upper half contains the strength results of the Blue force 
while the bottom half contains the Red strenb'1h results Column two, row one. of the matrix 
ind icates the appl icable side The strength results, penaining to a specific side, are reponed by 
entry ca,e and by replication number In column three of the matrix, Blue's response eGA is 
record ed, by case and replica tion The data for air and naval strengths are given in [Ref ::!] 
Figures G-4 thr ough G- 12 show the Red penetra:ion into South Korea, for each Red e GA and 
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APPE ND L\: H. GRA PH S 
The graph set is titled by ground tru th Red eOA and Blue entry case (e g a title of 
R I· E I means Red in ground truth pllrsues it s eOA I and Biuc conducts entr y case I). Each 
set contains twelve graphs Within each set , the daTa were separated into two categories 
Categol) ' one (first page of graph set) displays the data by eOt\ across the three replications 
for both Blue and Red Category two (second page of grap h set) disp lays the d~ta by 
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APPEN D[X I. LOG ISTICA L G RAPHS 
The graph sets are similar to the COA percept ion graphs Each Set comains four graphs 
Within each set. the data were separated into four categories Category one (first graph in 
Set) displays the data corresponding to Blue's perception of Red's attack time across the three 
replications Category two (second graph in set) displays the data corresponding to Blue's 
perception of the fl oat time across the replications Category three (third graph in set) 
displays the data corresponding to Bille's perception of Red's logistical flow across the three 
replications Category four (follnh graph in set) displays the data corresponding to Blue's 
perception of Red's logistical rate across all replicatiolls 
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Append ix: I 
Table '·1. R1-E1 Attack Time 
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Table 1-2. R1 -E2 Attack Time 
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Table 1-4 R2-E1 Attack Time 
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Table 1-6. R2-E3 Attack Time 
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A PPE NlHX J. DATA FOR TRADfTlONALANALYSIS 
rhe graphs are grouped in sets. ground-to-ground attrition, logistics. and Pcrsonnd 
strengths Each set has a data matrix and a corresponding table of graphs The dala mat rices 
display the Red ground truth eOA and MOE in the fir st co iLlmrl, and the Outcomes, by entry case 
and replication. in the subsequent col umns The tables graphically display the data from the 
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